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INTRODUCTION
Policy, scholarly, and popular discussions of the socially desirable 
level of protection provided by intellectual property rights typically 
take for granted that changes in the level of intellectual property pro-
tection matter a great deal.  It is commonly assumed to make a sub-
stantial difference in regulating access to intellectual goods whether 
patent claims are broadly or narrowly interpreted, the copyright term 
is longer or shorter, or the fair use exemption is applied more or less 
generously.  This assumption follows what appears to be an uncontro-
versial proposition commonly set forth in intellectual property juris-
prudence and scholarship:  patents, copyrights, and other entitle-
ments determine which technologies and creative works fall into the 
private domain (to which access is constrained) and which remain in 
the public domain (to which access is unfettered).1  In this Article, I 
show that this proposition should be controversial.  It is not clear that 
changes—even substantial changes—in intellectual property protec-
tion typically make any meaningful difference in regulating access to 
the underlying pool of intellectual goods, which in turn means that 
these changes do not clearly make any meaningful difference in regu-
lating the anticipated profits that drive innovation incentives.  Con-
trary to natural intuitions, the size of the public domain may be sub-
1 For indicative statements from case law, see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980), which quotes Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948), for the proposition that abstract ideas are “manifestations of . . . nature, free to 
all men and reserved exclusively to none,” and International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), claiming that “[t]he general 
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the 
air to common use.”  For indicative statements from the scholarly literature, see Yochai 
Benkler,  Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Pub-
lic Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 358 (1999), which states that “property rights in in-
formation mean that the government has prohibited certain uses or communications 
of information to all people but one, the owner.  The public domain, conversely, is the 
range of uses privileged to all.”  See also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY
L.J. 965, 968 (1990) (defining the public domain as “a commons that includes those 
aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect”). 
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stantially invariant to changes in intellectual property coverage.2  This 
qualified indifference thesis is founded in a well-established empirical 
observation:  firms generally can—and do—exploit devices other than 
intellectual property to limit access to, and thereby appropriate re-
turns from, innovation investments.3  Hence, intellectual goods that 
are unprotected by intellectual property may still be protected directly 
or indirectly by other legal or extralegal mechanisms, which broadly 
include technology, contract, organizational form, and various com-
plementary assets.   
If these alternative instruments can substantially replace the ap-
propriation capacities provided by intellectual property rights, then 
legal changes that constrain those rights and thereby ostensibly ex-
pand the public domain have no substantial net effect; conversely, if 
these alternative instruments can match or exceed the appropriation 
capacities provided by intellectual property rights, then legal changes 
that expand these rights and thereby ostensibly narrow the public 
domain have no substantial net effect.  This proposition is self-
evidently true in the extreme case where perfect technological locks 
can be implemented at zero cost:  contractions or expansions in intel-
lectual property coverage have no marginal effect on the access costs 
incurred by third parties and, as a consequence, on the innovation 
gains anticipated by resource holders.  In a broader class of interme-
diate settings, this proposition retains descriptive force to the extent 
that firms can exploit alternative instruments substantially to repro-
duce, or even surpass, the appropriation capacities provided by intel-
lectual property. 
If there is reason to doubt that nontrivial changes in intellectual 
property coverage always yield nontrivial effects on access to intellec-
tual goods, then there must be reason to doubt the incentives/access 
tradeoff that is the familiar foundation for normative discussions 
about the desirable scope of intellectual property.4  This tradeoff as-
sumes that more intellectual property generates social harm by reduc-
ing access to intellectual goods, but generates social benefits by en-
hancing anticipated profits and thereby enhancing innovation 
incentives.  Conversely, less intellectual property generates social 
2 There are a variety of definitions of the public domain in the scholarly literature.  
In this Article, I use it in the broadest practical sense, as referring to technologies and 
creative works that are freely accessible by third parties without the holder’s consent, 
whether as a matter of law, technology, or otherwise. 
3 See infra Section I.B. 
4 See infra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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benefits by expanding access to intellectual goods but generates social 
harm by reducing anticipated profits and thereby reducing innovation 
incentives.  Hence, the policy challenge lies in setting intellectual 
property coverage so as always to yield a net social gain.   
But the zero-sum tradeoff that drives this policy calculus does not 
hold universally, or even typically, as soon as we drop or relax the un-
stated but critical assumption that firms cannot use substantially cost-
equivalent exclusionary devices.  Without that assumption, the incen-
tives/access tradeoff is no longer a safe bet.  There can be no assur-
ance that (i) nontrivial contractions in entitlement strength will non-
trivially reduce the costs of accessing intellectual goods and thereby 
decrease innovators’ anticipated rewards and investment incentives, 
or (ii) nontrivial expansions in entitlement strength will nontrivially 
increase the costs of accessing intellectual goods and thereby increase 
innovators’ anticipated rewards and investment incentives.  Any re-
duction in intellectual property coverage will have trivial effects if it 
simply induces firms to migrate to the next-least-costly alternative in-
strument by which to maintain reasonably equivalent appropriation 
capacities; and any expansion of intellectual property coverage will 
have trivial effects if firms already make use of alternative instruments 
that deliver equivalent or greater appropriation capacities at a compa-
rable or lower cost. 
This line of argument immediately raises a conundrum:  if neither 
more nor less IP exerts a substantial effect on access costs and innova-
tion gains over some meaningful range of circumstances, then why do 
profit-maximizing firms expend resources on influencing changes in 
intellectual property coverage?5  Working out this conundrum yields a 
nuanced thesis that identifies more precisely the circumstances under 
which changes in intellectual property coverage do and do not matter.  
Even in a world of substantially cost-equivalent appropriation instru-
ments, intellectual property coverage still makes a difference so long 
as we make the reasonable assumption that alternative instruments—
or more precisely, the relative costs of using those instruments—are 
not equally distributed among all existing and potential participants 
in the relevant market.6  Where that assumption is satisfied, any 
change in entitlement strength does have nontrivial effects.   
Contrary to conventional assumptions, these are not effects on the 
total gains available as a result of the appropriation capacities pro-
5 See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra subsection II.B.1. 
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vided by legal instruments, but on the distribution of those gains 
among firms that exploit the appropriation capacities provided by a 
portfolio of legal and extralegal instruments.  Even if more or less in-
tellectual property makes no difference on the margin so long as the 
market generally can use substitute instruments to cover shortfalls in 
intellectual property coverage, it makes considerable difference on 
the margin if each individual firm incurs nonidentical costs in migrat-
ing to those substitute instruments.  If alternative instruments are not 
available at reasonably comparable cost to all actual and potential par-
ticipants in the relevant market, then relaxations of intellectual prop-
erty coverage will shift gains to firms that have the lowest-cost access to 
alternative instruments and away from firms that have the highest-cost 
access.  Hence, even if intellectual property has trivial effects as an in-
centive instrument with respect to the market as a whole, every indi-
vidual firm rationally invests resources in influencing intellectual 
property coverage.  Everything else being equal, reducing coverage 
will shift rents away from firms with higher-cost appropriation tech-
nologies (which should lobby for “critical” intellectual property) while 
increasing coverage will shift economic rents away from firms with 
lower-cost appropriation technologies (which should lobby against 
“excessive” intellectual property). 
If we recognize the typical availability of substantially cost-
equivalent alternative instruments, then intellectual property is trivial 
with respect to the total rents generated by innovation investment.  If 
we recognize that alternative instruments are typically distributed un-
equally across firm types, then intellectual property is nontrivial with 
respect to the distribution of rents in the relevant market.  Surpris-
ingly, the typical abundance of alternative instruments among incum-
bents and the typical paucity of such instruments among entrants im-
ply that the distributive effects of relaxing intellectual property may 
often be “regressive” and the distributive effects of increasing intellec-
tual property may often be “progressive.”7  Commentators usually as-
sume that distributive effects run in precisely the contrary direction:  
stronger intellectual property coverage presumably increases the entry 
costs incurred by small-firm entrants and therefore increases the pric-
ing power exercised by large-firm incumbents, which in turn punishes 
end-users.8  But if intellectual property typically has a differential, 
nontrivial impact on smaller firms that have the highest-cost access to 
7 See infra Section II.B. 
8 See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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alternative instruments, then the relationship may be reversed.  
Weaker legal protections exacerbate large firms’ inherent appropria-
tion-cost advantage over small firms, which in turn implies that in-
cumbents’ market share is more securely protected under less, not 
more, intellectual property coverage, which in turn enhances pricing 
power and punishes end-users.  Conversely, stronger intellectual 
property protections mitigate large firms’ inherent cost advantage in 
appropriating innovation rents, which in turn implies that large firms’ 
market share is less securely protected under more, not less, intellec-
tual property coverage, which in turn constrains pricing power and 
benefits end-users.  Contrary to the typical view that “strong IP” favors 
entrenched large firms while “weak IP” favors small-firm entrants, 
weak IP will often protect incumbents against entrants while strong IP 
will often protect entrants against incumbents. 
To summarize, intellectual property typically has trivial incentive 
effects but nontrivial (and often progressive) distributive effects.  But 
do these “progressive” distributive effects matter from a social point of 
view?  Venture capitalists and garage inventors are not the standard 
candidates for distributive equity.  Curiously, a refined understanding 
of intellectual property as a distributive instrument may breathe new 
life into the familiar, but empirically challenged, rationale for intellec-
tual property as an incentive instrument.  If we understand intellec-
tual property as primarily a distributive instrument that shifts rents 
away from incumbents characterized by high levels of integration and 
toward entrants or other entities characterized by low levels of integra-
tion, then intellectual property may matter as an incentive instrument 
that operates primarily and indirectly at the “macro” level of industrial 
organization.  In particular, if intellectual property supports the eco-
nomic viability of stand-alone, transactional structures that exhibit 
weak appropriation capacities, it may facilitate certain kinds of innova-
tion investment to which such structures are commonly thought to be 
well-suited, even if it has little effect on the total volume of innovative 
investment.  While further inquiry is certainly required, it can be con-
servatively stated that there is limited but meaningful evidence (and 
widespread belief in the business world) that small firms and variants 
thereof (in the business vernacular, start-ups, spin-offs, and the like) 
exhibit unique innovative competencies in some industries at certain 
stages of the innovation life cycle.9  Assuming that this view is more 
systematically demonstrated, then the conventional thesis that IP mat-
9 See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. 
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ters as an incentive device may turn out to retain a significant scope of 
application, but for an unconventional reason:  namely, because intel-
lectual property induces innovative output by firms that would other-
wise be disadvantaged by the inherent cost-advantage of large firms in 
capturing innovation returns through instruments other than intellec-
tual property. Following this hypothesis, the distributive and incentive 
effects of intellectual property would nicely coincide:  intellectual 
property makes the greatest difference in correcting distributional 
inequalities in appropriation costs in the same markets where it makes 
the greatest difference in eliciting innovative output from small-firm 
entrants and other weakly integrated entities. 
The discussion proceeds as follows:  in Part I, I review the incen-
tives/access tradeoff and the related assumptions that lie behind it, 
describe empirical evidence that challenges those assumptions, and 
then reformulate the limited conditions under which intellectual 
property coverage will matter as an incentive instrument; in Part II, I 
identify the broader conditions under which intellectual property will 
matter as a distributive instrument for allocating innovation rents across 
firm types; finally, in Part III, I explore how the distributive function of 
intellectual property may indirectly yield incentive effects by support-
ing innovation investment by small firms and other weakly integrated 
entities. 
I. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS AND IS NOT TRIVIAL
In this Part, I begin by drawing out the assumptions behind the 
conventional view that intellectual property is always nontrivial, which 
in turn supports the view that the incentives/access tradeoff always 
governs the choice between stronger or weaker levels of intellectual 
property protection.  Second, I review empirical evidence that chal-
lenges these assumptions.  Third, I identify a generic set of circum-
stances in which intellectual property does and does not matter as an 
incentive instrument, taking into account firms’ capacities to shield in-
novation rents through mechanisms other than intellectual property. 
A.  Why Intellectual Property Is Nontrivial (Always) 
Conventional discussions of intellectual property rest on a few 
common and interrelated propositions, which are usually left unstated 
in discussions that are otherwise dependent on these propositions be-
ing true in all or most cases.  These assumptions are detailed below. 
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Conventional Proposition I :  Less intellectual property increases 
the size of the public domain; more intellectual property de-
creases it. 
 This proposition would seem to follow self-evidently from the fact 
that intellectual property increases the cost of using otherwise freely 
accessible intellectual resources.  This in turn motivates widespread 
opposition to enclosure of the public domain by stronger forms of in-
tellectual property and widespread advocacy for weaker forms of intel-
lectual property to “free the commons.”10  Considered more closely, 
however, this proposition necessarily assumes that no other instru-
ments exist by which holders of intellectual resources can implement 
substantially equivalent access restrictions at some substantially equiva-
lent cost.  Hence, it is more precise to say that increasing or decreas-
ing the strength of intellectual property decreases or increases the size 
of the public domain, respectively, assuming the unavailability of 
other instruments by which resource holders can restrict access to 
substantially the same extent at substantially the same cost.  Where 
that assumption is not satisfied, the market simply fills any appropri-
ability deficit caused by the contraction of any state-provided property 
entitlement, and, conversely, the state simply mimics any market-
provided appropriation capacities when it expands any intellectual 
property entitlement.   
 This is true (self-evidently) in the extreme case where technologi-
cal locks on intellectual resources perfectly constrain access at zero 
cost:  whether the state reduces or adds intellectual property protec-
tions would have no incremental impact on the size of the public do-
main, which holds constant.  Even in intermediate scenarios where al-
ternative instruments imperfectly restrict access at some positive 
incremental cost, this observation retains considerable force:  expan-
sions or reductions in intellectual property coverage will have a lim-
ited incremental effect on the size of the public domain to the extent 
10 This literature is extensive.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW 
BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL 
CREATIVITY (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COM-
MONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001); Benkler, supra note 1; James Boyle, The Second 
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 33.  For an indicative contribution from the advocacy litera-
ture, see NANCY KRANICH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, INFORMATION COMMONS
(2004).  For a review of this literature, see Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property 
Grab:  Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 365 (2007). 
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that firms can exploit alternative instruments to achieve a similar level 
of coverage at some reasonably equivalent cost. 
Conventional Proposition II :  Less intellectual property decreases 
innovation gains; more intellectual property increases innova-
tion gains. 
 Conventional Proposition II follows self-evidently from Conven-
tional Proposition I.  If intellectual property matters because it con-
strains access to the public domain, then it must also matter because 
expanding the resource holder’s exclusive territory increases the gains 
that it can expect to derive from a successful innovation, which obvi-
ously increases its innovation incentives.  Hence, all else being equal, 
innovation incentives are stronger in a world with more complete in-
tellectual property coverage relative to a world with less complete cov-
erage.  Like Conventional Proposition I, Conventional Proposition II 
necessarily assumes that no other instruments exist by which resource 
holders can implement substantially equivalent access restrictions at 
some substantially equivalent cost.  Hence, it is more precise to say 
that increasing or decreasing the strength of intellectual property in-
creases or decreases innovation incentives, respectively, assuming the 
unavailability of other instruments by which resource holders can re-
strict access to substantially the same extent at substantially the same 
cost.  Again, that is self-evidently true in the extreme case where tech-
nological locks perfectly restrain access:  abolishing, or introducing 
even the strongest forms of, intellectual property makes no difference 
if innovators can exploit substitute technologies at zero incremental 
cost.  This proposition holds true in intermediate settings to the ex-
tent that resource holders can use some combination of alternative 
instruments to regulate access and thereby appropriate returns from 
innovation investments at some reasonably equivalent cost. 
Conventional Proposition III : Intellectual property always poses 
a zero-sum tradeoff between incentive gains and access costs. 
 Taken together, Conventional Proposition I plus Conventional 
Proposition II yields Conventional Proposition III.  Virtually all stu-
dents learn, many academic commentaries repeat, and countless judi-
cial opinions state that stronger or weaker intellectual property always 
involves an unavoidable tradeoff between increasing innovation in-
centives (and resulting innovation gains), which result from stronger 
intellectual property, and reducing access costs, which result from 
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weaker intellectual property.11  This is equivalent to stating simply that 
entitlement strength correlates positively with innovation gains and 
access costs; the policymaker’s challenge then is setting intellectual 
property strength such that innovation gains always exceed access 
costs.  Strictly speaking, the access costs generated by intellectual 
property protections are confined to deadweight losses incurred 
whenever a buyer is willing to pay the marginal cost of an intellectual 
good but not the supracompetitive premium rationally demanded by 
its legally exclusive holder.12  However, even an economically driven 
intellectual property regime would recognize that where a buyer is 
willing to pay the supracompetitive premium, distributive losses are 
incurred in the form of consumer surplus transferred from buyer to 
producer.  These efficiency and distributive effects together drive the 
basic incentives/access tradeoff:  marginal increases in intellectual 
property are socially desirable to the extent that marginal incentive 
gains exceed the associated bundle of marginal social costs; con-
versely, marginal decreases in intellectual property are socially desir-
able to the extent that marginal reductions in the associated bundle of 
social losses exceed marginal incentive losses.  However, if neither 
Conventional Proposition I nor Conventional Proposition II holds, 
11 The tradeoff is almost as old as the intellectual property system itself.  As cited 
by the Supreme Court, Thomas Jefferson stated, “‘[T]he things which are worth to the 
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent,’ . . . must outweigh the restrictive ef-
fect of the limited patent monopoly.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10-11 
(1966).  For contemporary examples, see ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 13-15 (4th ed. 2006), which states that in-
tellectual property solves the public-goods problem by providing exclusivity to artists 
and inventors but at the social cost of limited access and diffusion of new works and 
ideas, and WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 22-24 (2003), which argues that intellectual property 
should be designed to balance the benefits and costs in the incentives/access tradeoff. 
12 An important category of deadweight losses is also generated where efficient 
transactions are frustrated by legal, negotiation, and other administrative costs atten-
dant to an intellectual property regime.  This is a common theme of the expanding 
literature on “anticommons” effects, whereby proliferating intellectual property rights 
creates a “thicket” that impedes subsequent innovation.  See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, 
The Tragedy of the Anticommons:  Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 621 (1998) (stating that excessively fragmented property rights can generate 
net social losses by impeding, rather than facilitating, investment); Michael A. Heller & 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anticommons in Biomedical Re-
search, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (reiterating Heller’s thesis from The Tragedy of the Anti-
commons with respect to gene patents).  For a more nuanced treatment that takes into 
account the market’s potential ability to correct patent thickets, see Carl Shapiro, 
Navigating the Patent Thicket:  Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNO-
VATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).
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then the incentive gains and the access costs attributable to even sub-
stantial changes in intellectual property coverage may often be nomi-
nal (or, as I show below, perverse), in which case the zero-sum incen-
tives/access tradeoff is not a reliable framework for assessing 
proposed changes in intellectual property coverage. 
B.  Market Alternatives to Intellectual Property 
The conventional proposition that IP matters and the various as-
sumptions that stand behind it rest on a single (and usually unstated) 
empirical predicate:  namely, that firms have no or limited access to 
cost-equivalent substitutes for intellectual property by which to regu-
late access to intellectual resources.  Intellectual property must matter 
because it blemishes a pristine commons of intellectual goods free 
from restrictions on access.  To the extent that the above predicate is 
not satisfied, each of these assumptions loses considerable force or 
scope of application, which in turn challenges the basic proposition 
that intellectual property generally makes a difference in regulating 
access costs and incentive gains.  If firms can migrate to equivalent ex-
clusionary instruments at no or little positive incremental cost, then 
providing more or less intellectual property will make no difference in 
regulating access (contra Conventional Proposition I), which means 
that it will make no difference in regulating incentives (contra Conven-
tional Proposition II), which means that it does not involve any mean-
ingful (or at least any “directionally uniform”) tradeoff between inno-
vation gains and access costs (contra Conventional Proposition III).   
As discussed immediately below, a well-developed body of empiri-
cal evidence suggests that this required predicate is usually not sub-
stantially satisfied over a wide range of markets and industries, where 
firms typically use a combination of instruments other than intellec-
tual property to substantially contain knowledge spillovers.  Most strik-
ingly, economically significant markets exist in which firms exhibit lit-
tle reliance on intellectual property in order to appropriate returns 
from innovation investment but do rely on a host of other legal and 
extralegal instruments to regulate access.13  Consider the worldwide 
market in financial and other data, which operates with great success 
virtually bereft of intellectual property but uses technology to limit ac-
13 For a detailed taxonomy of such markets, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Sharing in the 
Shadow of Property:  Rational Cooperation in Innovation Markets 30-38 (Univ. of S. Cal. Sch. 
of Law, Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. C08-22, 2008) [hereinafter Bar-
nett, Sharing], available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1287283. 
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cess.14  Hence, contrary to conventional intuitions, the pristine com-
mons of an unregulated pool of intellectual resources may be a theo-
retical artifact that is rarely realized in practice.  And that means that 
policymakers rarely face a choice between intellectual property or no 
restrictions at all; rather, the real choice is between intellectual prop-
erty and some mix of substitute instruments to which resource holders 
will necessarily make recourse in order to capture innovation returns. 
Evidence for this claim is found most directly in multiple survey 
studies that use questionnaires (sent to managers of medium to large 
manufacturing firms) to assess the relative importance of patents as a 
device for appropriating revenues relative to all other available in-
struments.15  The results are remarkably consistent across time and in-
dustry:  outside of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, man-
agers consistently rank patents among the least effective appropriation 
instruments and rarely respond affirmatively when asked if patent pro-
tection is a “but for” condition for undertaking a research project.16
14 To be precise, U.S. law provides virtually no protection for the factual content of 
database products, while the European Union provides certain sui generis protections for 
database products.  Compare Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362-
64 (1991) (holding that a phone directory could not be the subject of copyright protec-
tion because it was not sufficiently original), with Parliament & Council Directive 96/9, 
On the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20, 20 (EC) (noting that “data-
bases are at present not sufficiently protected” and acting to cure this deficiency). 
15 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 790-91 (surveying R&D 
managers in publicly traded firms in the United States with substantial R&D expenses); 
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation:  An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 173, 174 
(1986) (surveying R&D managers of one hundred randomly chosen U.S. firms from 
twelve industries); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets:  Appropri-
ability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 4 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000) (surveying R&D managers randomly 
drawn from a sample of all R&D labs in the United States operating as part of a manu-
facturing firm).  For a similar earlier survey using a smaller data set of forty-four U.K. 
firms, see C.T. TAYLOR & Z.A. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYS-
TEM 81-83 (1973). 
16 See TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 15, at 194-99 (finding that in twenty-four 
out of thirty companies in the sample set, managers believed that R&D investment was 
not or was minimally dependent on expected patent protection, and noting that com-
panies that relied on patent protection were in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals sec-
tors); Mansfield, supra note 15 (finding that firm managers in all industries other than 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals believed that, absent patent protection, inventions dur-
ing that period would have decreased not even thirty percent); see also Levin et al., su-
pra note 15, at 798 (finding that managers, outside chemicals and pharmaceuticals, 
often view patents as ineffective mechanisms to protect against imitation, and that 
managers use alternative devices to do so); Cohen et al., supra note 15, at 9 (finding 
that most industries, other than chemicals and pharmaceuticals, viewed patents as the 
least effective mechanism for appropriating returns from innovation). 
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The studies were conducted from the 1970s through the early 2000s, 
and, hence, presumptively rebut any meaningful correlation with con-
temporaneous changes in the perceived level of patent protection (in 
particular, the persistence of these results through the latest study re-
buts any expectation that firms would attribute greater value to pat-
ents as a result of the Federal Circuit’s increased enforcement of pat-
ents starting in the early 1980s).  The apparent lack of correlation 
between managers’ subjective ranking of the importance of patent 
protection and the legal strength of patent protection conforms nicely 
with other studies that have sought to identify, in various contexts, 
correlations between levels of R&D investment and changes in the le-
gal strength of patent protection.17  Remarkably, no determinate rela-
tionship can be identified:  that is, the aggregate investments made by 
firms in R&D (as distinguished from firms’ investments in patent 
prosecution and enforcement) do not appear to be affected—or 
stated most conservatively, do not seem to be systematically affected—
by upward or downward adjustments in the effective strength of pat-
ent protection. 
The aforementioned studies principally provide a ranking order 
of intellectual property relative to other appropriation instruments, 
where intellectual property tends to fall toward the bottom of the 
scale, and measure the sensitivity of innovative output to intellectual 
property coverage, which tends to be low.  Business-management 
scholars have developed a large empirical literature that supplies an 
important complementary knowledge base by providing extensive de-
tail on the diverse inventory of substitute devices by which firms can 
substantially regulate access.  These alternative instruments can be 
17 Multiple studies have reached this type of result.  See, e.g., Josh Lerner, The Eco-
nomics of Technology and Innovation:  150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM. ECON. REV. PA-
PERS & PROCEEDINGS 221, 222-23 (2002) (examining 177 policy changes in patent pro-
tection across 60 countries over a 150-year period and finding that changes have little 
effect on patenting rates by domestic entities but a meaningful effect on patenting by 
foreign entities); Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Stronger Protection or Technological Revo-
lution:  What Is Behind the Recent Surge in Patenting? 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 6204, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6204 
(finding that patenting rates have risen but measures of R&D intensity showed no sig-
nificant change in recent years).  For a fuller review of the evidence on whether pat-
ents provide incentives to invest in innovation, see generally James Bessen & Michael J. 
Meurer, Do Patents Perform Like Property?, ACAD. MGMT. PERSPS., Aug. 2008, at 8. 
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usefully organized into four general categories, discussed briefly in 
turn below.18
1.  Technology 
The most obvious alternative to intellectual property is technol-
ogy, which is used widely by resource holders to limit unauthorized 
access, especially to tacit knowledge without which it is often difficult 
to replicate a successful product.  Technologies for regulating access 
can be understood broadly to include secrecy precautions that con-
strain leakage of valuable information, formal and informal nondis-
closure practices that govern research and development, and any 
product configuration or manufacturing process that increases third 
parties’ replication costs.  These can be surprisingly effective and long-
lasting (consider the Coca-Cola formula):  contrary to the conven-
tional framework where imitators perfectly copy an original technol-
ogy at virtually no cost, empirical inquiries tend to find that competi-
tors often incur substantial costs in replicating an existing product.19
In other industries, firms successfully use technology to condition ac-
cess by end-users to what is otherwise a legally unprotected intellectual 
good:  consider Bloomberg, the leader in the worldwide market for fi-
nancial data (as noted above, largely unprotected under copyright 
law20), which requires that users purchase product-specific “Bloomberg 
terminals” in order to use the firm’s database.  Or, closer to home for 
a legal audience, consider the Westlaw or LexisNexis services for U.S. 
case law:  while the immediate product is unprotected under copy-
right law,21 the providers limit usage through technological measures 
18 For a more detailed review of relevant evidence, see Jonathan M. Barnett, Pri-
vate Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1257-69 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Barnett, Private Protection].
19 See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents:  An Empirical Study, 91 
ECON. J. 907, 909-10 (1981) (U.K.) (finding, based on interviews with firm managers in 
several industries, that imitation costs average about sixty-five percent of the cost in-
curred in innovation and that imitation time averages about seventy percent of the 
time required to develop the original product).  Note that Mansfield defines imitation 
costs and time broadly to include both product development and all subsequent 
“bringing to market” costs.  Id. at 909. 
20 See supra note 14. 
21 This observation is supported, in increasing scope of application, by case law, see
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668 (1834) (refusing to allow copyright protec-
tion for Supreme Court opinions), statute, see 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2006) (precluding 
copyright protection for federal governmental works), and Copyright Office policy, see
COMPENDIUM II: COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 305.08(d) (1984) 
(disallowing copyright protection for federal or state government documents). 
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that effectively constrain access subject to a pricing schedule.  And as 
is well known in the software, online-entertainment, and consumer-
electronics sectors, firms make wide use of encryption, copy-
protection, and a variety of other “digital rights management” (DRM) 
technologies that can finely regulate user access based on pricing 
plans and various other criteria.22
2.  Contract 
Firms widely use contractual instruments to impose limitations on 
the use of their products.  Various examples can be cited.  In the soft-
ware industry, vendors attach “shrinkwrap” and “clickwrap” agree-
ments to software purchased at retail or online venues, respectively, 
and bind the purchaser to terms that may exceed the rights to which 
the vendor is entitled under copyright or patent law.  Every reader has 
almost certainly engaged in such a transaction.  Suppose you 
download a copy of the standard version of Adobe Acrobat, the popu-
lar application for reading and producing PDF files.  You will immedi-
ately become subject to the eleven-page Adobe Software License 
Agreement (available in thirty-two languages) that imposes a variety of 
obligations—including, among other things, covenants not to reverse 
engineer “or otherwise attempt to discover the source code” of the 
software and, subject to certain exceptions, not to transfer the soft-
ware or authorize the software to be copied to another individual’s 
computer.23  Through this contractual instrument, Adobe constructs a 
customized and detailed intellectual property regime enforceable 
against the end-user irrespective of any rights to which Adobe may be 
entitled under intellectual property law. 
This example illustrates a basic point:  even if copyright or patent 
protection were abolished, firms could still bind point-of-sale consum-
ers and other directly transacting parties through contractual restric-
22 DRM covers a broad range of technologies that regulate, track, and meter ac-
cess to digital and online content—including text, audio, video, and photographic im-
ages—using encryption, encoding, digital watermarking, user authentication, and 
other techniques.  For an overview of these technologies, see LAWRENCE HARTE, IN-
TRODUCTION TO DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (DRM) (2006).  For a critical review 
with special reference to the anticopying technologies that protect DVDs, see TARLE-
TON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT: COPYRIGHT AND THE SHAPE OF DIGITAL CULTURE ch. 6
(2007), and with reference to music, see PATRICK BURKART & TOM MCCOURT, DIGITAL 
MUSIC WARS: OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 102-11 (2006). 
23 ADOBE Software License Agreement cls. 4.3 & 4.5, available at http:// 
www.adobe.com/products/eulas/pdfs/Gen_WWCombined-20080205_1329.pdf (last 
visited April 15, 2009). 
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tions.  While the enforceability of these contracts is sometimes con-
tested, the law seems fairly settled in most jurisdictions that these con-
tracts are relatively immune to challenge so long as certain notice and 
other procedural requirements to satisfy judicial concerns over ag-
gressive “fine print” tactics are met.24  In sophisticated licensing trans-
actions involving patented technologies or copyrighted works, rights 
holders typically include a variety of provisions that (among other 
things) limit the usage of the licensed technologies to geographically, 
commercially, or technologically defined “fields of use” or provide for 
“grant back” rights that require the licensee to share with the licensor 
any improvements that the licensee makes to the technology.  In the 
context of corporate research and product development, firms con-
strain the outflow of tacit and other human-embodied knowledge 
through contractual provisions that punish employees economically 
for departing a firm—most notably, through noncompete provisions 
(admittedly of dubious enforceability in some jurisdictions) or forced-
resale provisions (and other provisions of similarly punitive effect) in 
employee stock-option agreements.  In all these contexts, contract 
provides an important instrument by which resource holders limit ac-
cess, both by identified third parties with whom they enter into fully 
negotiated business relationships and unidentified third parties with 
whom they transact anonymously in the retail context. 
3.  Organization 
Firms can select among a wide variety of structures to organize the 
research-and-development, production, marketing, and distribution 
functions that comprise any innovation process.  Broadly speaking, 
these structures can be situated along a spectrum ranging from com-
plete integration—where all functions are performed in-house—to 
zero integration—where a disembodied firm contractually outsources 
all functions.  Each of these structural choices provides firms with dif-
ferent appropriation capacities.  In general, increased integration im-
proves a firm’s ability to contain spillovers, where integration is under-
stood to include both (i) vertical integration down the supply chain 
24 For a well-known decision that strongly upholds end-user licenses, see ProCD, 
Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996).  For a more measured decision 
that advances a standard by which online contracts are enforceable provided that cer-
tain context-specific procedural requirements are satisfied, see Specht v. Netscape Com-
munications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).  Note that the ProCD deci-
sion also rejects (and notes other circuits that reject) challenges to end-user licenses 
based on “preemption” arguments under copyright law.  See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-54. 
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from production through distribution, and (ii) horizontal integration 
across a portfolio of related products and services.25  Hollywood film 
studios have historically followed a horizontal-integration strategy, 
which internalizes spillovers from successful releases by investing re-
sources in the production of a wide variety of collateral merchandise 
and other derivative applications in a series of sequels and other adap-
tations.26  Pharmaceutical firms have historically followed a vertical in-
tegration strategy, which internalizes spillovers by undertaking re-
search, testing, production, and marketing through in-house 
functions, thereby limiting any inadvertent outflows of proprietary 
knowledge.27  Intermediate options between full and zero integration 
include a wide variety of joint ventures, partnerships, and strategic al-
liances, where firms integrate some functions while using contractual 
instruments and equity investments to implement other functions 
through arm’s length or long-term cooperative relationships with 
other firms.  These hybrid arrangements are typical in the biophar-
maceutical industry, which relies on contract- and equity-based part-
nerships between “upstream” suppliers of biotechnology innovations 
and “downstream” providers of capital-intensive production, market-
ing, and distribution capacities.28  Through these varied organizational 
structures, participating firms can finely regulate voluntary knowledge 
“between-flows” among coventurers while limiting involuntary knowl-
edge “outflows” to nonparticipants. 
25 Note that I am using “horizontal integration” in a manner that departs some-
what from standard usage, where it usually refers to a firm’s acquisition of its direct 
competitors.  The phenomenon described in the text above could alternatively be 
called a diversified or conglomerate form of organization. 
26 On the diversified, conglomerate structure that tends to characterize firms that 
dominate the film and related media markets, see RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUS-
TRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE 314, 318-24 (2000), which observes 
that dominant media firms tend to operate diversified operations across cable, TV, 
publishing, and film markets—identifying Time Warner, Disney, News Corporation, 
and Viacom as examples—and attributes this diversified structure to an attempt to cap-
ture synergies through multiple applications of the same set of creative inputs within a 
single firm given the high costs of using arm’s length contracts to achieve the same result. 
27 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Cultivating the Genetic Commons:  Imperfect Patent Protec-
tion and the Network Model of Innovation, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 987, 1016-17 (2000) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Genetic Commons].
28 See id. at 1015-21; see also David B. Audretsch, The Role of Small Firms in U.S. Bio-
technology Clusters, 17 SMALL BUS. ECON. 3 (2001); Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participa-
tion To Support Exchange:  Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109 
(1989); Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Strategic Alliances:  An Empirical 
Analysis of Biotechnology Collaborations (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 6014, 1997). 
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4.  Complementary Assets 
Business history is littered with the remains of firms with brilliant 
ideas that never achieved substantial market penetration.  It is well es-
tablished in the business-management literature that the commercial 
success of a new technology is critically dependent on a firm’s ability 
to bundle its technology with complementary assets that facilitate se-
curing market share against actual and potential competitors.29
Broadly speaking, these assets encompass (i) economies of scope in 
the form of complementary goods and services offered to the target 
consumer (including service and support functions), (ii) economies 
of scale in the form of marketing, production, and distribution effi-
ciencies, and (iii) firm goodwill.30  Properly speaking, complementary 
assets form part of the total products-and-services bundle that any 
competitor must replicate in order to deliver a reasonable economic 
substitute that can threaten the incumbent’s market position.  Hence, 
any competitor in the consumer-goods industry will face a powerful 
obstacle simply by virtue of the fact that the leaders have access to an 
existing set of complementary assets in the form of goodwill, world-
wide distribution and marketing networks, production infrastructure, 
and contractual and other relationships, all of which take years to ac-
cumulate and are not amenable to rapid imitation.   
Complementary assets are a powerful tool that can substantially 
raise third parties’ entry costs; hence, even in industries where the 
underlying technology enjoys little to no robust protection from intel-
lectual property, these inherent cost barriers mean that established 
firms can reasonably expect to have the capacity to defend innovation 
rents against smaller-firm entrants.  And conversely, smaller-firm en-
trants cannot reasonably expect to have substantial capacity to achieve 
the same outcome, which in turn reduces competitive threats and in-
creases incumbents’ pricing power even in the absence of any formal 
instrument by which to frustrate entry.  Empirical studies that exam-
ine some or all of these factors provide ample support for this view, 
29 For the leading source, see David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation:  
Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 
288 (1986), which explains, “In almost all cases, the successful commercialization of an 
innovation requires that the know-how in question be utilized in conjunction with 
other capabilities or assets.” 
30 This list commonly includes tacit knowledge, which I have incorporated under 
the technology category discussed above. 
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showing that established incumbents historically exert a strong “first 
mover” advantage over subsequent entry threats.31
C.  Why Intellectual Property Is Trivial (Sometimes) 
Intuitively, we conceive of intellectual property as a legal instru-
ment that uniquely imposes access restrictions on intellectual goods 
that are otherwise open to public use.32  But it is more precise to say 
that intellectual property sets a per-unit price for coverage against un-
authorized usage, which in turn regulates the rate of substitution by 
firms between intellectual property and all other available mecha-
nisms by which to regulate access to intellectual goods.  This reformu-
lated framework is grounded in the rich body of empirical evidence 
showing that intellectual property rarely acts as a firm’s unique source 
for imposing access restrictions on intellectual goods.33  Intellectual 
property is therefore only one member of any firm’s portfolio of ap-
propriation instruments, each of which can be construed as offering 
“units of coverage” against unauthorized usage of intellectual goods at 
a certain, constant per-unit cost.34  Each firm must then elect whether to 
expend resources on adopting and enforcing formally available intel-
lectual property rights or implementing some combination of alterna-
tive instruments to secure innovation returns.  This is a variant on the 
31 For a review of the literature, see William T. Robinson et al., First-Mover Advan-
tages from Pioneering New Markets:  A Survey of Empirical Evidence, 9 REV. IND. ORG. 1 
(1994) (Neth.).  For further reviews of the literature that reach a similar view and pro-
vide independent research reaching similar results in selected markets, see Mary 
Lambkin, Order of Entry and Performance in New Markets, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 127, 127 (1988), which states that “[i]t is widely believed, both by academics 
and management practitioners, that early entrants into newly developing markets en-
joy an enduring competitive advantage over later entrants,” and providing independ-
ent research further confirming this view, and Gary L. Lilien & Eunsang Yoon, The
Timing of Competitive Market Entry:  An Exploratory Study of New Industrial Products, 36 
MGMT. SCI. 568, 569 (1990), which describes research showing that pioneering en-
trants generally maintain their market-share advantage and that pioneer entry is one of 
the major determinants of the long-term success of a new product.  I note that some 
commentators contest whether the first-mover advantage is sometimes overstated, and 
that others even identify a second-mover advantage whereby pioneering firms’ innova-
tions are imitated by latecomers or existing incumbents.  For various illustrations of 
this thesis, see STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES (1994). 
32 See supra note 1. 
33 See supra subsections I.B.1-4. 
34 Note that I assume throughout that (i) while the costs of coverage differ across 
instruments, the units of coverage are homogenous, and (ii) there are no complemen-
tarities between appropriation instruments.  It would be interesting to relax one or 
both of these assumptions in a more extended analysis. 
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economizing problem that commonly drives the transaction-cost-
economics literature,35 where the firm selects governance structures so 
as to limit the costs of third-party opportunism; in this construct, the 
firm allocates resources within its appropriation portfolio so as to 
maximize coverage against (and thereby limit the costs of) third-party 
expropriation of its intellectual resources. 
Suppose that a firm has a fixed “appropriation budget” of re-
sources dedicated to shielding innovation returns against third-party 
expropriation.36  When legal changes reduce the strength of an intel-
lectual property entitlement, the per-unit cost of obtaining coverage 
through intellectual property effectively rises, which induces the firm 
to shift resources toward the next-least-costly alternative instrument in 
its portfolio so as to sustain its existing coverage to the maximum ex-
tent possible.  When legal changes increase the strength of an intellec-
tual property entitlement, the per-unit cost of coverage through intel-
lectual property effectively falls, which induces the firm to shift 
resources away from the next-least-costly instrument in its portfolio so 
as to maximize coverage.  To illustrate this idea more concretely, sup-
pose that a new legal standard makes it harder to defend the nonob-
viousness of a patent claim (as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 
2007 decision in KSR International v. Teleflex Inc.37):  everything else be-
ing equal, firms will rationally divert resources from adoption and en-
forcement of patents to alternative appropriation devices.  Alterna-
tively, suppose that a new legal standard makes it easier to defend the 
validity of a patent claim over nontechnical subject matter (as illus-
trated by the Federal Circuit’s 1998 decision in State Street Bank & 
35 For the seminal reference, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE (1996). 
36 This fixed-budget assumption is a simplification for expositional purposes, 
equivalent to supposing a firm that expends all of its resources on appropriation activi-
ties and cannot access external capital.  This assumption would be relaxed in a more 
extended analysis that explicitly models the firm’s consumption choice as a function of 
the elasticity of the firm’s demand for coverage against unauthorized usage with re-
spect to changes in the cost of obtaining coverage through available appropriation in-
struments.  Note that, generally speaking, it can be expected that relaxing the fixed-
budget assumption would make the indifference thesis (“IP does not matter”) more 
robust with respect to downward adjustments in intellectual property (since firms 
could expand the appropriation budget to fully replicate withdrawn state-provided ap-
propriation capacities), which is the focus of this Article’s analysis, but less robust with 
respect to upward adjustments in intellectual property (since firms could expand the 
appropriation budget to exploit additional state-provided appropriation capacities).  
In subsequent discussion, I show that certain applications of the indifference result 
hold even where this assumption is relaxed.  See infra subsection I.C.4. 
37 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.38):  everything else being 
equal, firms will rationally divert resources from alternative mecha-
nisms to patents.  So long as we assume a fixed appropriation budget 
and reasonably cost-equivalent alternative instruments, it logically fol-
lows that any firm’s appropriation capacities are substantially invariant 
to the level of intellectual property protection. 
Contrary to conventional expectations, IP does not always matter; 
rather, it is always an empirical question subject to the difference in 
per-unit cost of coverage between the relevant intellectual property 
entitlement and the next-least-costly combination of substitute in-
struments.  This analysis will focus on the case where the state relaxes 
or even abolishes intellectual property protections over the relevant 
set of intellectual resources.39  The market will not “sit still” in re-
sponse to the withdrawal of intellectual property coverage.  Firms will 
rationally divert the resources previously used to adopt and enforce 
the lapsed entitlement to the next-least-costly alternative instrument, 
thereby preventing some to almost all of the underlying intellectual 
resources from reverting to the public domain.  Empirical evidence as 
described above—technology, contract, organization, and comple-
mentary assets—provides a firm basis for believing that the stock of al-
ternative instruments is rich and therefore the value of any cost differ-
ence often may be nominal.40  That is, there typically exist effective 
alternatives to cover substantially any reduction in intellectual prop-
erty protection so that resource holders simply respond to downward 
adjustments in intellectual property coverage by diverting resources to 
alternative instruments.  If so, then each of the Conventional Proposi-
tions is, at best, nominally true in a meaningful range of circum-
stances:  that is, any firm’s ability to control access, and therefore its 
anticipated incentive gains, is largely invariant to the effective level of 
intellectual property coverage, given that a firm approximately main-
38 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
39 The remainder of the discussion will continue to focus primarily on downward 
adjustments in intellectual property coverage, in part for reasons of space and in part 
because that is the proposed policy change under debate at the moment.  As suggested 
by the general articulation of the discussion so far, I believe that the analysis would 
substantially apply with some modification to upward adjustments in intellectual prop-
erty coverage.  The basic intuition is simple.  The same circumstances where downward 
adjustments of intellectual property make no difference are the same circumstances 
where upward adjustments of intellectual property make no difference:  alternative 
instruments replicate the appropriation outcomes that firms would rationally secure by 
law at the same or higher cost. 
40 See supra subsections I.B.1-4. 
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tains its appropriation capacities by shifting resources within its ap-
propriation portfolio. 
A simple hypothetical will suffice to illustrate how this thesis com-
plicates the incentives/access tradeoff that drives the standard policy 
calculus.  Suppose that a profit-maximizing firm devotes its appropria-
tion budget to protect 100% of the gains generated by its innovation 
investment through the adoption and enforcement of patent instru-
ments.  Now suppose that patents are abolished and therefore drop 
out of the appropriation portfolio.  Does this affect the firm’s ability to 
capture the gains from its investment ex post and hence its innovation 
incentives ex ante?  Following a conventional analysis, the outcome is 
clearly determinate (so determinate that the question appears rhe-
torical):  access costs will fall given the withdrawal of patent protection 
and the resulting expansion of the public domain, which in turn will 
cause innovation gains to fall as firms anticipate reduced appropria-
tion capacities.  But this reflects a static approach that fails to take into 
account market responses to changes in intellectual property protec-
tion.  Following a dynamic approach, the outcome is indeterminate 
without further information.  Firms may respond to the withdrawal of 
patent protection by migrating to alternative instruments that make up 
most of any lost appropriation capacity, in which case even a nontrivial 
reduction in patent coverage has a trivial effect in reducing access costs 
and innovation returns.41  Even more dramatically, as argued further in 
subsection I.C.4, firms may migrate to alternative instruments that sur-
pass any withdrawn appropriation capacities, in which case a nontriv-
ial reduction in patent coverage has the nontrivial but perverse effect 
of increasing access costs and reducing innovation returns. 
In contrast to the single determinate outcome anticipated in stan-
dard commentary, a dynamic analysis contemplates multiple possible 
outcomes following any downward adjustment in intellectual prop-
erty.  Each outcome, however, can be anticipated at some level of ap-
proximation as a function of the direction and size of any incen-
tive/access effect as a result of the reduction in intellectual property 
coverage.  Where the direction is positive (i.e., less IP reduces innova-
tion gains and access costs), then the effect is “nonperverse”; and 
41 Note that my distinction between “static” and “dynamic” approaches does not 
track the distinction, sometimes made in intellectual property (and antitrust) com-
mentary, between a static efficiency approach, which seeks to align market pricing with 
marginal cost (and therefore implies weak or no intellectual property rights), and a 
dynamic efficiency approach, which seeks to enable innovators to recover the fixed costs 
of research and development (and therefore implies strong intellectual property rights). 
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where size is substantial, the effect is “nontrivial,” and vice versa.  If, 
for simplicity, we use binary assignments of positive/negative values 
for direction and large/small values for size, then these outcomes can 
be derived based on the interaction between these two variables, as 
shown in Table 1 below.  In case A, direction is positive and size is 
large, in which case innovation gains and access costs are reduced, fol-
lowing the standard incentives/access tradeoff; in case B, direction is 
positive but size is small, in which case the incentive/access tradeoff 
holds but to a trivial extent; and in case C, size is large but direction is 
negative, in which case innovation gains are reduced but access costs 
are increased, thereby partially reversing the standard incen-
tives/access tradeoff. 
Table 1:  Possible Effects of Downward Adjustment in  
Intellectual Property Coverage 
Size (large) Size (small) 
Direction (positive) A—Nonperverse, Nontrivial B—Nonperverse, Trivial 
Direction (negative) C—Perverse, Nontrivial — 
A conventional static analysis views direction and size as fixed val-
ues:  direction is always positive and size is always large, in which case 
the nonperverse, nontrivial result (case A) anticipated by standard 
commentary always and exclusively applies.  But a dynamic analysis an-
ticipates that both size and direction may vary.  Size will vary as deter-
mined by the value of D, which denotes the difference in the per-unit 
cost of coverage between the relevant intellectual property entitle-
ment and the remaining portfolio of alternative instruments.  Suppose 
that D = Ka – Kb , where Ka equals the cost per unit of coverage pro-
vided by the relevant intellectual property instrument and Kb equals 
the cost per unit of coverage provided by alternative instruments.  
Standard analysis assumes (without demonstrating) that it is always the 
case that the value of Kb is infinite or exorbitant relative to the value of 
Ka, in which case Ka < Kb and D < 0.  This assumption implies that the 
firm will decline to adopt any alternative instrument in order to cure 
the appropriability shortfall, which means, in turn, that innovation 
gains and access costs always correlate positively with entitlement 
strength following the standard policy calculus (case A above).  How-
ever, if we contemplate an unlimited range of negative and positive 
values for D (which is to say, we contemplate that the value of Kb is not 
always infinite or exorbitant relative to the value of Ka and may some-
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times fall below it), then the standard relationship no longer necessar-
ily holds to any substantial extent and can even be reversed.  Specifi-
cally, two contrary outcomes may be obtained:  (i) where Ka = Kb, then 
D = 0 (or, more realistically, Ka Kb, so that D  0) and there is no ef-
fect or no substantial effect (case B above); and (ii) where Ka > Kb,
then D > 0, and, under certain additional assumptions described be-
low, there can be a perverse effect (case C above).42
Below, I explore in greater detail these idealized cases, presented 
in the form of four stylized scenarios that exhibit different incentive 
effects and access effects consequent to downward adjustments in in-
tellectual property protection.  These include (i) two “simple” scenar-
ios that demonstrate the extreme cases where there are no or perfect 
substitutes for intellectual property protection (corresponding to 
cases A and B above, respectively) and (ii) two “complex” scenarios 
where there exists a range of imperfect substitutes for intellectual 
property protection (corresponding to the perverse case C above and 
a variant of nontrivial case A).  Each scenario exhibits standard or 
nonstandard effects on incentive gains and access costs as a result of 
two factors:  (i) the distribution of per-unit costs of coverage across 
available appropriation instruments; and (ii) the distribution of units
of coverage across available appropriation instruments.  The following 
discussion identifies more precisely the conditions under which 
downward adjustments in intellectual property are and are not likely 
to exert any effect on innovation gains and access costs and, as a re-
sult, the conditions under which the standard incentives/access 
tradeoff is and is not likely to provide a reliable guideline for policy 
analysis of changes to intellectual property protections. 
1.  Simple Scenario I:  Certainly Nontrivial, Nonperverse Effect 
In Simple Scenario I, the cost of alternative instruments in the 
firm’s appropriation portfolio is exorbitant or infinite relative to the 
cost of abolished intellectual property instruments.  This would be sat-
isfied in the case where there exists no substitute for intellectual prop-
erty protection.  Somewhat remarkably, given the substantial body of 
42 Some readers may observe that this perverse result, where a reduction in intel-
lectual property coverage causes firms to purchase higher levels of coverage through a 
less costly, alternative instrument, begs the question of why a firm would have ever 
used the costlier (and now unavailable) legal instrument to achieve less coverage.  The 
answer is that stronger protection may degrade the value of the product, in which case 
lower levels of coverage may maximize profits if firms must accept a sufficient discount 
on “excessively” protected goods.  For further discussion, see infra subsection I.C.4. 
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empirical evidence to the contrary,43 this is the case that drives most 
legal and economic analysis of intellectual property, which assumes 
that intellectual goods that are legally unprotected by intellectual 
property entitlements are actually unprotected.  That is, any asset that 
is not protected by law falls into the open-access public domain.44
Where this assumption is maintained, any downward adjustment in 
intellectual property is clearly nontrivial and yields all of the standard 
effects:  reduced innovation incentives and increased access costs, 
which then requires that normative analysis proceed on the basis of 
the standard incentives/access tradeoff.  But that is a result that simply 
follows by construction from an artificial set of assumptions that will 
infrequently or even rarely be satisfied in any practical setting.  Clearly 
this is not the paradigm case that should govern policy discussions of 
intellectual property. 
2.  Simple Scenario II:  Certainly Trivial, Nonperverse Effect 
In Simple Scenario II, the cost of alternative instruments is equal 
or approximately equal to the cost of abolished or curtailed intellec-
tual property instruments.  This would be satisfied in the case where 
there is an exact substitute for intellectual property protection.  Un-
der this assumption, it self-evidently follows that eliminating intellec-
tual property protection makes no difference since firms can substi-
tute other instruments to achieve the same level of protection, in 
which case none of the standard effects follow:  more or less intellec-
tual property protection has no effect on innovation incentives or ac-
cess costs and hence does not generate the conventional incen-
tives/access tradeoff for purposes of normative analysis.  Clearly this, 
too, is not the paradigm case that should govern policy discussions of 
intellectual property. 
3.  Complex Scenario I:  Potentially Nontrivial, Nonperverse Effect 
Simple Scenario I is obviously unrealistic.  It must almost always be 
the case that firms have some other feasible instrument by which to 
raise competitors’ imitation costs to some extent, and empirical in-
quiries suggest that those alternative instruments typically raise com-
petitors’ imitation costs by a substantial amount.  But this scenario can 
easily be modified by simply assuming that the cost of alternative in-
43 See supra Section I.B. 
44 See supra note 1. 
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struments less the cost of abolished or curtailed intellectual property 
instruments yields a positive but nonexorbitant value.  This would be 
satisfied in a world where there exist materially but not radically cost-
lier alternatives to intellectual property protection.  Under this as-
sumption, eliminating or curtailing intellectual property has a nontriv-
ial effect to the extent that a firm’s reallocation of its fixed 
appropriation budget to the next-least-costly set of substitute instru-
ments will not fully replicate the protection formerly provided by in-
tellectual property.   
The direction of this effect is clear and follows standard expecta-
tions:  the relaxation of intellectual property protection results in re-
duced coverage of the relevant pool of intellectual goods, in which 
case access is decreased, innovation incentives are reduced, and nor-
mative evaluation can proceed on the basis of the standard incen-
tives/access tradeoff.  But note that the size of this effect is not clear:  
that is, whether this certain effect is weakly or strongly nontrivial de-
pends on the relative distance between the lapsed intellectual prop-
erty instruments and the next-least-costly combination of alternative 
instruments.  Where that distance has a small value, downward ad-
justments in intellectual property coverage can reduce incentives and 
increase access by only a small magnitude.  Where that distance has a 
large value, however, abolishing intellectual property protection may 
make a significant difference, as the next-least-costly instrument 
stands at a considerable distance from the lapsed intellectual property 
instrument.  In this latter case, firms will be unable to incur the in-
cremental nontrivial costs of covering the entire shortfall by substitut-
ing toward alternative instruments.  Where it costs substantially more 
to replicate the coverage formerly provided by intellectual property 
instruments, downward adjustments in intellectual property roughly 
follow conventional expectations:  incentives are reduced and access is 
increased by nontrivial magnitudes, in which case normative analysis 
can proceed on the basis of the standard incentives/access tradeoff. 
This familiar nontrivial case is illustrated using hypothetical values 
in Table 2, below.  Suppose that a record label spends $10 to purchase 
100 units of coverage for each digital release through a copyright enti-
tlement (which yields a per-unit cost of coverage equal to $0.10); then 
suppose that copyright protection is abolished or widely ignored in 
the relevant jurisdiction; and finally, suppose that the firm can spend 
the same $10 per release to implement a contractual license that can 
only deliver 80 units of coverage (which yields a per-unit cost of cover-
age equal to $0.125).  That is, the contractual substitute exerts inferior 
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appropriation capacities relative to copyright protection, with the re-
sult that the firm internalizes a smaller portion of its innovation in-
vestment while third parties incur lower access costs.  The relaxation of 
intellectual property protection causes a rise in the per-unit cost of 
coverage available to the resource holder, which in turn causes a fall in 
the number of units of coverage that can be purchased, which in turn 
limits the price that the producer can demand.  Following the standard 
incentives/access tradeoff, access by third parties is increased at the 
price of reduced profits and incentives on the part of the innovator. 
Table 2:  Nontrivial, Nonperverse Outcome:  Less IP  
Reduces Gains, Increases Access45
Units of 
Coverage
Total Cost of 
Coverage Price Profits
No Protection 0 $0 $0 $0 
Copyright Protection 100 $10 $40 $30 
Next-Least-Costly Protection 80 $10 $32 $22 
4.  Complex Scenario II:  Potentially Nontrivial, Perverse Effect 
Recall that a dynamic analysis proposes that relaxations in intel-
lectual property coverage induce all firms to migrate to the next-least-
costly instrument in their appropriation portfolio so as to maintain 
their appropriation capacities to the maximum extent possible.46  As-
suming a fixed budget of appropriation resources, this implies that, if 
there is anything but perfect cost equivalence between intellectual 
property and alternative instruments, then any reduction in intellec-
tual property coverage always yields some reduction in appropriation 
capacities, and hence, some reduction in anticipated innovation gains.  
Using the same amount of appropriation resources, firms that substi-
tute toward the next-least-costly appropriation instrument will neces-
45 Note that the figures in the “Profits” column assume that “cost of coverage” is 
the sole marginal cost (so profits equal price minus cost of coverage).  This reflects a 
market where (i) the marginal cost of production and distribution is zero, and hence 
(ii) the vendor’s pricing power is entirely derived from the exclusivity that it can estab-
lish through appropriation instruments, whether intellectual property or other devices.  
This would seem to describe the online music market, the provisional example dis-
cussed above.  For simplicity, I exclude the vendor’s fixed costs. 
46 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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sarily be able to purchase fewer units of coverage than had previously 
been made available through the lapsed intellectual property entitle-
ment.  If this is the case, then the direction of the access and incentive 
effects of “more or less IP” is certain, but the size is uncertain, contin-
gent solely on the difference in the per-unit cost of coverage provided 
by the next-least-costly appropriation instrument relative to the lapsed 
intellectual property instrument.  So the effect is always nonper-
verse—less IP always means lower access costs and lower innovation 
gains—but the magnitude may or may not be nontrivial. 
But even the direction may be uncertain.  The nonperverse result 
implicitly assumes that a firm can always purchase precisely the num-
ber of units of coverage that it desires, but at increasing costs per unit 
of coverage as it moves through its appropriation portfolio.  This en-
sures that a firm’s substitution of the next-least-costly instrument in its 
portfolio would always provide coverage at some level that is lower 
than the preexisting level of coverage:  given a fixed appropriation 
budget and a higher per-unit cost of coverage, the firm is forced to 
settle for a reduced appropriation capacity.  However, even the direc-
tion of the effect could be uncertain if alternative instruments deliver 
units of coverage in “lumpy” quantities, such that the next-least-costly 
instrument (again, on a per-unit basis) offers more units of coverage 
than the firm had previously purchased using the withdrawn intellec-
tual property entitlement.  In that case, the next-least-costly appro-
priation instrument can only deliver appropriation capacities in an 
amount that exceeds the firm’s appropriation budget.  If we maintain 
the assumption of a fixed appropriation budget, the firm must then 
settle for zero appropriation capacities (since the minimum number 
of units of coverage that are available would exceed the budget); if we 
relax that assumption, the firm may divert resources from other uses to 
purchase a stronger but non-profit-maximizing amount of coverage. 
A simple numerical example can illustrate this contingency, which 
is then presented in Table 3(a) below.  Suppose, as above, that a re-
cord label spends $10 to purchase 100 units of coverage for each digi-
tal release through a copyright entitlement (which yields a per-unit 
cost of coverage equal to $0.10); then suppose that copyright protec-
tion is abolished in the relevant jurisdiction; and finally, suppose that 
the firm can spend $25 per release to implement a DRM technology 
that can deliver “packages” of at least 200 units of coverage (which 
yields a per-unit cost of coverage equal to $0.125).  In this scenario, 
the technological substitute is superior to copyright protection, with 
the result that the firm internalizes a greater portion of its innovation 
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investment, and third parties incur higher access costs under a lower
(zero) level of copyright protection. 
But why would the firm not simply have used this more potent but 
more expensive instrument previously?  If we assume a fixed appro-
priation budget, then the answer is straightforward:  the firm could 
not afford it.  If we relax that assumption, then we can hypothesize 
that the firm may have rationally declined to use this more potent al-
ternative instrument because it degraded the value of its product, 
thereby limiting the price that it could demand from consumers, so 
that the firm maximizes profits at some imperfect level of protection 
against third-party access.  However, given the absence of copyright 
protection, it may now be profit maximizing for the record label to 
employ this once-disfavored alternative:  that is, if the firm now faces a 
choice between zero units of coverage (at $0), which will invite free 
imitation and push down price to marginal cost (assumed to be $0), 
and excessive units of coverage (200 units at $25), which will still yield 
some positive profits, it will rationally select the latter as its “second-
best” option.  The firm would not have selected this option if the ap-
propriation portfolio still included an intermediate level of coverage 
(100 units at $10).  This result is set forth in tabular form below, using 
hypothetical values to illustrate the stylized results. 
Table 3(a):  Nontrivial, Perverse Outcome:   
Less IP Reduces Gains and Access47
 Units of 
Coverage
Total Cost of 
Coverage Price Profits
No Protection 0 $0 $0 $0 
Copyright Protection 100 $10 $40 $30 
Next-Least-Costly Protection 200 $25 $35 $10 
There is an interesting alternative to this hypothetical, whereby a 
perverse result can be reached without relaxing the assumption of a 
fixed appropriation budget.  Suppose all the facts and hypothetical 
values stated above, except that DRM technology delivers 200 units of 
coverage at $10 per release (rather than $25 as supposed above).  This 
would mean that DRM represents the firm’s “next-most-costly” appro-
priation technology as compared to copyright and therefore com-
47 See supra note 45 for some assumptions behind these values. 
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fortably fits within its appropriation budget.  Put differently, the 
lapsed intellectual property entitlement delivered coverage at a higher 
per-unit cost (100 units of coverage for $10, yielding a per-unit cost of 
coverage equal to $0.10) relative to the alternative appropriation in-
strument (200 units of coverage for $10, yielding a per-unit cost of 
coverage equal to $0.05).  But the firm will nonetheless accept this 
deal with reluctance:  given that it must purchase at least 200 units of 
coverage, use of the DRM technology sufficiently degrades the value 
of the firm’s product such that its profits are lower than they would be 
in a world in which copyright protection exists (but still higher than 
the zero profits obtained without purchasing any protection).  Even 
though the DRM technology is more potent and has a lower per-unit 
cost of coverage relative to copyright, the firm maximizes profits by 
using the weaker and less cost-effective form of coverage.  This is re-
flected in the following table. 
Table 3(b):  Nontrivial, Perverse Outcome:   
Less IP Reduces Gains and Access48
 Units of 
Coverage
Total Cost of 
Coverage Price Profits
No Protection 0 $0 $0 $0 
Copyright Protection 100 $10 $40 $30 
Next-Most-Costly Protection 200 $10 $35 $25 
Both cases illustrate that the directional effect of any downward ad-
justment in intellectual property coverage can be perverse:  that is, 
depending on the composition of the firm’s appropriation portfolio, 
relaxing intellectual property protections can induce migration to an 
alternative instrument that is more potent than the lapsed intellectual 
property instrument and therefore increases access costs.  At the same 
time, innovation incentives are reduced under a higher level of cover-
age because the firm earns lower profits due to product degradation:  
that is, reducing copyright protection forces the firm to utilize alterna-
tive instruments at non-profit-maximizing levels.49  Where intellectual 
48 See supra note 45 for some assumptions behind these values. 
49 This possibility is vividly illustrated by the animal-breeding industry, where breed-
ers apparently remedied the appropriability shortfall created by weak or nonexistent in-
tellectual property protection by imposing strict contractual limitations and employing 
in-breeding practices to maintain control over livestock.  See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Response, 
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property protection is constrained, firms may rationally migrate to 
draconian alternative instruments that result in product degradation 
but nonetheless enhance profits relative to having no protection at all.  
In short, intellectual property can be nontrivial but perverse:  less IP 
can reduce innovation incentives—following conventional expecta-
tions—while also increasing access costs—contrary to conventional 
expectations.50
II. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IS NOT TRIVIAL (SOMETIMES)
The discussion above has identified conditions under which 
downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage are likely to 
exert a trivial effect on access costs and innovation incentives, in 
which case innovative output will be roughly constant across the broad 
range of weak to strong intellectual property regimes.  In this Part, I 
identify the conditions under which adjustments in intellectual prop-
erty coverage can make a difference, not as an incentive instrument 
for regulating innovative output, but as a distributive instrument that 
shifts innovation rents from the holders of higher-cost appropriation 
instruments to the holders of lower-cost appropriation instruments. 
A.  An Unconventional View of Intellectual Property 
In the foregoing discussion, I have set forth a few simple, prelimi-
nary propositions: 
Fragile Equilibria, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/01/22/dreyfuss.   
50 There is an interesting “virtuous” variant of this perverse scenario.  If we sup-
pose an upward adjustment in intellectual property protections and assume a suffi-
ciently lumpy distribution of units of coverage across appropriation instruments, then 
increasing intellectual property can sometimes increase innovation gains (following 
the standard outcome) but decrease access costs (contrary to the standard outcome).  
This will be possible where the previous low (or zero) level of intellectual property pro-
tection compelled the firm to select a non-profit-maximizing, excessive number of 
units of coverage provided by an alternative instrument.  An increase in intellectual 
property coverage enables the firm to select a lower number of units of coverage, 
thereby avoiding product degradation and increasing the price that can be demanded 
from consumers.  Applying the same analysis as used to generate the “perverse” out-
comes identified above, this result can hold under a certain range of values whether 
the per-unit cost of coverage provided by the intellectual property instrument is more 
or less expensive than the existing alternative instrument (i.e., whether the alternative 
instrument is the next-least-costly or next-most-costly instrument in the firm’s appro-
priation portfolio). 
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Unconventional Proposition I : Intellectual property has a trivial 
effect on innovation incentives given perfect or near-perfect 
cost equivalence between intellectual property and alternative 
instruments.
Unconventional Proposition II : Intellectual property has a non-
trivial effect on innovation incentives where there is a lack of 
perfect or near-perfect cost equivalence between intellectual 
property and alternative instruments.  The size of this effect, 
however, may be weakly nontrivial where there is no substan-
tial difference between the cost of any lapsed formal instru-
ment and the next-least-costly alternative instrument. 
Unconventional Proposition III : Intellectual property has a non-
trivial but perverse effect on innovation incentives if we as-
sume (i) a substantial cost difference between intellectual 
property and alternative instruments, and (ii) a lumpy distri-
bution of the “units of coverage” across appropriation tech-
nologies such that the firm reallocates resources to the next-
least-costly (or even next-most-costly) instrument that delivers 
more units of coverage than the lapsed intellectual property 
instrument.
These propositions collectively illustrate a fundamental thesis:  
there is no ground to presume the standard positive correlation be-
tween entitlement strength, on the one hand, and innovation incen-
tives (more IP means more output) and access costs (more IP means 
more access costs), on the other hand, unless we assume that firms can 
only use alternative instruments at a substantially higher per-unit cost 
of coverage relative to intellectual property entitlements.  Where 
there is substantial cost equivalence between legal and extralegal in-
struments, the incentives/access tradeoff has considerably less force.  
Even substantial downward adjustments in intellectual property have 
no appreciable effect on access costs, in which case (everything else 
being equal) innovation incentives are substantially unaffected and 
technological or creative output should be roughly constant.  More-
over, even if the underlying assumption is satisfied—that is, even if 
there is not substantial cost equivalence, but alternative instruments 
deliver coverage in sufficiently “lumpy” quantities—then the former, 
but not the latter, correlation will hold true.  That is, decreasing enti-
tlement strength may lower output following conventional expecta-
tions but increase access costs contrary to expectations.  Firms will ra-
tionally substitute toward appropriation instruments that deliver more 
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coverage at a higher total cost (which can imply a higher or lower per-
unit cost) than the firm would otherwise be willing to fund.  In short, 
the incentive/access tradeoff will sometimes yield a lose-lose result:  
less IP delivers both less output and less access.51
I will now focus on Unconventional Proposition II, which will, at 
varying magnitudes, yield the conventional positive correlation be-
tween entitlement strength and innovation incentives and access costs.  
Intuitively, this seems to capture most broadly the typical appropria-
tion landscape in which firms tend to operate in most markets:  nei-
ther the extreme scenario where there are no substitutes for intellec-
tual property (Simple Scenario I) nor the extreme scenario where 
alternatives to intellectual property are perfect substitutes (Simple 
Scenario II).  If we assume—as seems at least reasonable based on 
available evidence—that firms typically do have access to a wide range 
of alternative instruments at some nonexorbitant incremental cost, 
then it would follow that, in a large number of circumstances, even 
substantial downward adjustments in intellectual property protection 
are trivial or do not have a substantial effect with respect to innovation 
incentives and access costs.  However, even if we are comfortable with 
the existing evidence on this point in some markets, we should pre-
serve some meaningful scope of application for the conventional “IP 
matters” thesis.  To hold that reductions in intellectual property cov-
erage make no or little difference with respect to innovation gains and 
access costs requires a further assumption:  namely, it must be the case 
that the costs of implementing substantially equivalent appropriation 
instruments are distributed roughly equally among actual and poten-
tial market participants.  If that is not the case, then only a partial in-
difference thesis holds:  while a reduction in intellectual property cov-
erage will have a trivial effect on total innovation gains and total access 
costs, it will have a nontrivial effect on the distribution of innovation 
gains and access costs among the total pool of market participants. 
Recall the extreme case where there is perfect cost equivalence 
between intellectual property and an alternative instrument in the 
form of a perfect technological lock.  Obviously, stronger or weaker 
intellectual property coverage makes no difference in firms’ total ap-
propriation capacities, in which case innovation gains and access costs 
should be unaffected.  Now suppose two firms, A and B, each of which 
51 Conversely, as noted supra note 50, there are plausible circumstances where in-
creases in intellectual property protections can deliver a win-win result:  more IP deliv-
ers both more output and more access. 
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are contemplating making expenditures to develop, produce, and dis-
tribute mutually noninfringing technologies that will exhibit roughly 
comparable cost and noncost attributes, except (i) A expects that it 
can protect its product against imitation by using the lock at a cost 
equivalent to enforcing available patent protections, and (ii) B ex-
pects that it can only do so at some substantially higher cost.  Then 
stronger or weaker intellectual property clearly does matter in influ-
encing the distribution of rents across firms, for the simple reason 
that only A can expect to accrue rents without patent protection.  If 
patent protection is available, both firms enter, and all rents in the 
market are split equally between A and B, who are protected against 
outside entry; without patent protection, however, only A rationally 
enters, and therefore accrues all available rents in the market, while B
rationally declines to make any investment at all.52
This hypothetical identifies circumstances where total rents in the 
market hold approximately constant irrespective of radical changes in 
intellectual property, but the distribution of those rents among indi-
vidual firms in the market is radically altered.  This case (of which 
multiple intermediate variants could be imagined) illustrates a simple 
proposition:  so long as we assume an unequal distribution of cost-
equivalent alternative instruments, less IP inherently advantages firms 
that have the lowest costs of substituting toward alternative instru-
ments, while more IP will inherently ameliorate any such cost advan-
tage, thereby sustaining firms that have the highest costs of substitut-
ing toward alternative instruments. 
This yields an additional proposition: 
Unconventional Proposition IV :  Intellectual property has (i) a 
trivial effect on innovation output if there is substantial cost 
equivalence between intellectual property and alternative in-
struments, but (ii) a nontrivial effect on the distribution of 
innovation gains across firms if substantially cost-equivalent al-
ternative instruments are unequally distributed across actual 
and potential market participants.  
52 This hypothetical assumes that (i) where both A and B enter, tacit collusion pre-
serves supracompetitive rents, and (ii) where only A enters, B would not invest simply 
to exploit the opportunity to accrue the short-term gains from underpricing A, so long 
as B would still be unable to recover its fixed-cost R&D expenditures, resulting in an 
anticipated net loss.  Presumably B could not extract a portion of A’s anticipated mo-
nopoly rents by threatening to sell its technology to a third party, so long as informa-
tional asymmetries (which are especially severe prior to product development, as as-
sumed above) render any such threat sufficiently noncredible. 
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 We can therefore suppose a market where, following element (i), 
even complete elimination of intellectual property protection has lit-
tle or no effect on total innovation output because firms taken as a 
whole recover appropriation capacities through extralegal instru-
ments.  However, following element (ii), the absence of intellectual 
property selects against firms that have the highest-cost access to al-
ternative, cost-equivalent appropriation instruments while it selects for 
firms that have the lowest-cost access.  Thus, intellectual property is 
trivial as an incentive instrument but nontrivial as a distributive in-
strument.  Put differently, assuming a robust supply of alternative ex-
clusionary instruments, the total amount of innovation rents under a 
stronger or weaker intellectual property regime is roughly invariant 
while the distribution of rents varies considerably. 
Extrapolating from Unconventional Proposition IV, we can now 
state more completely the conditions under which intellectual prop-
erty will and will not matter.  Specifically, more or less intellectual 
property has completely trivial effects where two conditions are met:  (i) 
there is substantial cost equivalence between intellectual property and 
alternative instruments, and (ii) cost-equivalent alternative instru-
ments are distributed roughly equally across firms.  Where assumption 
(i) is not satisfied, then intellectual property is nontrivial as an incen-
tive instrument; where assumption (ii) is not satisfied, then intellec-
tual property is nontrivial as a distributive instrument.  Where both as-
sumptions are satisfied, then intellectual property is trivial in both 
respects.  This taxonomy of possible outcomes is summarized in Table 
4, below. 
Table 4:  Incentive and Distributive Effects of Intellectual Property 
Equal Distribution Unequal Distribution 
Cost Equivalence Completely Trivial Trivial Incentive Effect; 
Nontrivial Distributive
Effect
Non–Cost Equivalence Nontrivial Incentive Effect; 
Trivial Distributive Effect 
Completely Nontrivial 
These multiple outcomes stand in contrast to conventional com-
mentary, which effectively presumes without contemplation that the 
“Completely Nontrivial” result is the only possible result.  In particu-
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lar, these results pose a challenge to two standard assumptions in 
scholarly and popular discussions of intellectual property.  First, these 
results show that there is no determinative incentive effect of weaker or 
stronger intellectual property coverage,53 absent information as to the 
distribution across alternative instruments of the costs of coverage 
(and, to be complete, information as to the distribution of units of 
coverage across alternative instruments, which can give rise to per-
verse outcomes).  Second, even where there is substantial cost equiva-
lence, and, therefore, innovative output should be roughly constant 
across different levels of intellectual property coverage, there is no de-
terminative distributive effect of weaker or stronger intellectual prop-
erty coverage, absent information as to the distribution across firms of 
the costs of using alternative instruments. 
Scholarly and popular commentary normally assume that stronger 
intellectual property coverage has regressive distributive effects by 
shifting rents toward large firms that then enjoy strengthened barriers 
against market entry; and conversely, that weaker intellectual property 
coverage has progressive distributive effects by lowering entry barriers 
and shifting rents toward users and small firms that have limited ac-
cess to alternative appropriation technologies.  Take a typical example 
from a recent contribution, where the author states that allocating 
strong intellectual property rights presents a policy tradeoff between 
increasing innovation incentives by improving anticipated profits and 
raising barriers to entry by consolidating control over a particular in-
dustry.54  That statement makes the implicit (and seemingly uncontro-
versial) assumption that a world with stronger intellectual property 
rights will necessarily impose higher entry costs, and therefore exhibit 
higher market concentration, relative to a world with weaker intellec-
tual property rights.  But that assumption can easily be falsified.  Con-
sider a counterexample:  in the late nineteenth century, U.S. railroads 
formed information clearinghouses to which member firms disclosed 
53 This refers to the standard positive correlation between innovation incentives 
and intellectual property protections.  See supra Section I.A. 
54 Tim Wu, Essay, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decentralized Decisions, 92 VA.
L. REV. 123, 123-26 (2006).  This example is merely indicative of a long-standing argu-
ment in intellectual property commentary.  For a historical example, see TEMP. NAT’L
ECON. COMM., 76TH CONG., PATENTS AND FREE ENTERPRISE (S. Comm. Print 1941) 
(prepared by Walton Hamilton), in ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDA-
TIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 46 (2004), which argues that during the nineteenth 
century patent rights foreclosed entry by individual inventors into mature technologi-
cal fields while individual inventors flourished in any field where patent rights were 
absent.
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technical knowledge, apparently in order to generate a large body of 
prior art that could operate to strike down any nonmember patent 
claims.55  Consistent with this interpretation, member firms advised 
each other on how to innovate so as to design around nonmembers’ 
patents and lobbied for legislative and judicial changes to limit patent 
damages and effect other favorable changes in the patent laws.56
This result seems anomalous under a conventional static analysis 
of intellectual property coverage.  But a dynamic analysis of intellec-
tual property coverage fully anticipates this outcome insofar as it does 
not make any directionally uniform assumption as to the distributive 
effects of weaker or stronger levels of legal protection against third-
party imitation.  Weaker patent rights most likely protected the mar-
ket position of incumbents in the railroad industry, who were well 
sheltered against entry by the large fixed capital costs required to en-
ter the industry.  This observation can be generalized.  If we anticipate 
that firms respond to adjustments in intellectual property coverage by 
substituting toward market alternatives in order to sustain appropria-
tion capacities and assume that firms do not incur equal costs in ex-
ploiting alternative instruments, it follows that stronger intellectual 
property rights can easily reduce entry costs and endanger incumbents’ 
market position.  The distributive effects of weaker or stronger intel-
lectual property coverage therefore depend on the relative costs in-
curred by different firms to substitute toward alternative instruments.  
Following that formulation, there is no ground to expect, as a general 
matter, that the standard distributive effect of upward and downward 
adjustments in intellectual property will be uniformly regressive or 
progressive, respectively.  But this observation does not consign policy 
analysis to mere guesswork:  the same dynamic framework supplies an 
analytical instrument by which to anticipate reasonably the distributive 
effects of adjustments in intellectual property coverage based on a 
well-defined set of relevant variables.  I will now consider these dis-
tributive effects in greater detail. 
55 See Steven W. Usselman, Patents Purloined:  Railroads, Inventors, and the Diffusion of 
Innovation in 19th-Century America, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 1047, 1049 (1991) (“By pool-
ing information regarding technical experiments and coordinating legal action, rail-
roads developed the ability to establish precedence that could invalidate most patent 
claims against them.”). 
56 See id. at 1064-74 (chronicling the collusive behavior of railroad patent associa-
tions).
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B.  Distributive Effects of Intellectual Property 
Two typical scenarios can be envisioned that reverse or fail to rep-
licate the standard distributive outcomes associated with upward or 
downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage:  (i) “vertical” 
distributive effects, whereby rents are shifted from small-firm entrants 
to large-firm incumbents, and (ii) “horizontal” distributive effects, 
whereby rents are shifted among large firms situated roughly at the 
same level of industrial organization.  Both effects are a function of 
the relative costs that firms incur in migrating to alternative appro-
priation instruments, but only the former effect is likely to be an out-
come that demands policy intervention from a social point of view. 
1.  Vertical Distributive Effects 
The business-management and industrial-organization literatures 
widely agree that large, established firms have greater access to alter-
native appropriation instruments relative to smaller entrants.  This is 
largely due to the fact that most of these instruments—firm goodwill, 
economies of scale, and production and distribution capacities and 
efficiencies—are inherent by-products of the vertically integrated 
forms of organization and/or long-term market positions that tend to 
characterize incumbent firms.57  Following this observation, the stan-
dard distributive result attributed to intellectual property is largely re-
versed:  weaker intellectual property will have regressive effects by pro-
viding large firms with an appropriation-cost advantage over any 
potential small-firm competitor that must incur greater costs to repli-
cate the incumbent’s appropriation capacities.  Under that same as-
sumption, stronger intellectual property will have progressive effects by 
providing small firms with a tool by which to combat the natural ap-
propriation-cost advantage of larger firms.  That is, weak intellectual 
property can act as a barrier to entry that protects the market position 
of incumbents while strong intellectual property can act as a critical 
tool by which entrants can challenge incumbents’ market position.  
Without patent protection, small-firm innovators (who, notably, are not 
part of the sample sets in the aforementioned survey studies that cast 
doubt on the relative importance of patent protection58) are arguably 
57 For statements to this effect, see David B. Audretsch & Zoltan J. Acs, Innovation 
as a Means of Entry:  An Overview, in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY 222, 224-25 
(P.A. Geroski & J. Schwalbach eds., 1991), and Gary P. Pisano, The R&D Boundaries of 
the Firm:  An Empirical Analysis, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 153, 155 (1990). 
58 See supra note 15. 
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left to the mercy of established large firms and will, therefore, have sub-
stantially reduced incentives to undertake innovation projects.59
This intuition is amply confirmed by historical lobbying behavior 
in the patent context, which shows that small inventors (or investment 
entities that fund small inventors) tend to promote strong intellectual 
property coverage while large technology-dependent firms (outside of 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals) tend to promote moderate and 
sometimes even weak or zero levels of intellectual property coverage.60
Following a dynamic analysis of adjustments in intellectual property 
coverage, this is an unsurprising outcome.  Small firms rationally an-
ticipate that any withdrawal of intellectual property coverage will op-
erate to the advantage of larger firms, which bear fewer incremental 
costs in curing the resulting appropriability shortfall by recourse to al-
ternative instruments.  Conversely, large firms rationally anticipate 
that any withdrawal of intellectual property coverage will operate to 
the disadvantage of small firms, which bear larger incremental costs in 
curing the resulting appropriability shortfall by recourse to alternative 
instruments.
2.  Horizontal Distributive Effects 
The distributive effects of stronger or weaker intellectual property 
coverage may simply amount to socially indifferent resource transfers 
among large firms, none of which presents a plausible candidate for 
distributive equity.  Suppose that an intellectual property entitlement 
is abolished and firms can recover at least some appropriation capaci-
ties by recourse to complementary assets that are not accessible at 
equal cost by all market participants.  Reconsider our earlier hypo-
thetical, in which copyright is no longer available to protect digitally 
released musical works, but with one modification:  record labels have 
little access to substitute instruments for copyright but other entities 
have abundant access.  This is not a far cry from the real world.  The 
effective erosion of copyright protection over recorded music appears 
59 Several authors make similar observations.  See Levin et al., supra note 15, at 797; 
Richard Gilbert & Zvi Griliches, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research & De-
velopment:  Comments and Discussion, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 787, 
831; Cohen et al., supra note 15, at 2-3. 
60 See Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process:  How Innovation Markets Select Innova-
tion Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 39-42, on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Barnett, Property as Process] (examining this phenomenon in the fi-
nancial-services, information-technology, and semiconductor industries). 
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to injure the record labels61 while benefiting hardware manufactur-
ers—such as Apple—and original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs)—which sell portable media devices—whose utility increases 
as the cost of storable content falls.62  Similarly, this erosion benefits 
ticket-selling, concert-promotion, and venue-management companies, 
which derive revenues from the sale of tickets to live performances, 
which are in turn promoted by the diffusion of free musical content.63
Downward adjustments in intellectual property coverage will then 
have little impact on total innovation rents but will shift those rents 
across firms, or even markets, so that entities that incur the lowest cost 
of accessing the substitute appropriation technology will tend to cap-
ture market share from entities that do not.  Thus, the erosion of 
copyright in music may have little effect on the total rents generated 
by musical output, but it nonetheless operates to the great detriment 
of the record labels, which have relatively higher-cost access to any al-
ternative instruments; and to the great benefit of hardware manufac-
turers and concert promoters, which have relatively lower-cost access 
to complementary assets that enable holders to capture at least some 
of the rents generated by music production, which now operates as a 
61 For reviews and independent research relating to the economic injury suffered 
by record labels as a result of piracy, see Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing:  Creative Destruc-
tion or Just Plain Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006), and Martin Peitz & Paul Wael-
broeck, The Effect of Internet Piracy on Music Sales:  Cross-Section Evidence, 1 REV. ECON.
RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 71, 78 (2004). 
62 See Michael A. Einhorn, Gorillas in Our Midst:  Searching for King Kong in the Music 
Jungle, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 145, 153 (2008) (observing that Apple sells its iTunes 
downloads at no profit in order to sell iPods); A Catchy New Tune:  After a Decade of Chaos, 
Has the Record Industry Finally Hit upon the Right Model?, ECONOMIST, Oct. 4th–10th 2008, 
at 14 (observing that the delivery of music to complement the iPod and other portable 
devices offers an alternative to the traditional music business model based on the di-
rect sale of recorded music); Dan Moren, Apple Is Music Industry’s Public Enemy No. 1,
MACWORLD, May 30, 2008, http://www.macworld.com/article/133694/2008/05/ 
drmenemy.html (stating that record labels have lost their historical control over music 
distribution as Apple now dominates the market for online music downloads). 
63 See Einhorn, supra note 62, at 158 (noting that concert-promotion companies 
now occupy important positions in the music industry, with Live Nation being “the 
largest promoter of live concerts in the world” and “the second-largest entertainment 
and management company in the world”); A Change of Tune:  Faced with Shrinking Prof-
its, Record Labels Are Touting a New Approach, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2007, at 64, 64-65 (not-
ing that concert revenues have been rising as CD sales, which increasingly serve pri-
marily to advance performance revenues, have been falling); Ethan Smith, Rock’s New 
Republic, WSJ., Winter 2008, at 76 (stating that Live Nation, the leading promoter of 
live concert performances, is seeking to take the place of record labels as the primary 
intermediary in the music industry, encompassing music, concert, and merchandise 
market segments). 
2009] Is Intellectual Property Trivial? 1731
“loss leader” to facilitate the sales of concert tickets and consumer-
electronics devices.  So long as incentive effects at the production and 
distribution levels are largely unchanged (which, to be sure, is still an 
open empirical question), the associated selection effects—whereby 
the record industry loses but the hardware and concert-promotion in-
dustries win—is a matter of social indifference from a distributive 
point of view. 
III. WHY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAY BE INDIRECTLY
NONTRIVIAL (SOMETIMES)
The discussion above has yielded the following proposition:  more 
or less intellectual property sometimes makes little difference in the 
total amount of innovation rents but great difference in the allocation 
of innovation rents among various participants in the market based on 
their relative costs of exploiting alternative appropriation instruments.  
This proposition nicely tracks two otherwise irreconcilable but well-
established social facts:  (i) there is little evidence that stronger or 
weaker intellectual property results in appreciably greater or lesser 
levels of innovation investment,64 and (ii) firms and other participants 
devote substantial resources to influencing the levels of intellectual 
property protection made available by the state.65  If intellectual prop-
erty makes little difference on the margin as an incentive device, then 
result (i) is entirely anticipated; if intellectual property makes a sub-
64 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
65 Private-firm expenditures on influencing intellectual property legislation are 
large by any measure.  For examples in copyright and patent, respectively, see WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 16 (2004) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY] (citing data 
from the Center for Responsive Politics showing that in 1996, media interests donated 
$1.5 million to six of the sponsors of the Copyright Term Extension Act); Posting of 
Donald Zuhn to Patent Docs:  Biotech & Pharma Patent Law & News Blog, Lobbying 
Spending Spree Continues, http://www.patentdocs.org/2008/05/lobbying-spendi.html 
(May 20, 2008) (reporting that Millennium Pharmaceuticals, Genentech, AstraZeneca, 
and Abbott Laboratories each spent between $1.28 million and $4.4 million on lobby-
ing in 2007, most of which presumably addressed patent reform or related issues).  
Firms and industry associations exert influence at the judicial level by regularly filing 
amicus curiae briefs in leading litigations.  See LANDES & POSNER, POLITICAL ECONOMY,
supra, at 19; see also Brief of Business Software Alliance, Software and Information In-
dustry Ass’n, Information Technology Industry Council, and Information Technology 
Ass’n of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, eBay, Inc. v. MercEx-
change, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-0130) (arguing against the Federal Circuit’s 
automatic-injunction standard in patent infringement cases); Brief of Biotechnology In-
dustry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 
(arguing for the retention of the automatic-injunction standard). 
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stantial difference on the margin as a distributive device, then result 
(ii) is also entirely anticipated.  If intellectual property sometimes op-
erates principally as a distributive device for allocating innovation 
rents among market participants, then downward or upward adjust-
ments in intellectual property can be reduced to simple politics:  intel-
lectual property outcomes mediated by the judicial and/or legislative 
processes are socially indifferent reflections of privately self-interested 
investments by firms and other participants to maximize their por-
tions of the social pie generated by innovation investment.   
Individual firms recognize that stronger or weaker intellectual 
property regimes reward or punish firms that have higher-cost or 
lower-cost access to certain alternative appropriation technologies and 
self-interestedly undertake lobbying actions to generate the level of 
intellectual property protection that maximizes the firm’s competitive 
cost advantage or minimizes its competitive cost disadvantage.  It is no 
accident that craft guilds opposed patent protection in the early mod-
ern era:  this protection represented an appropriation instrument that 
would enable individual inventors to overcome the powerful appro-
priation-cost advantages of the established guild entities, protected by 
alternative instruments in the form of goodwill, know-how, and imper-
fect legal exclusivity over the employment of skilled labor and the sale 
of certain goods.66  And it is no accident that record labels vigorously 
support copyright protection in our late modern era:  this represents 
an appropriation instrument that enables them to overcome the ap-
propriation-cost advantages of hardware manufacturers, concert pro-
moters, and other holders of complementary assets, which (unlike re-
cord labels) can recoup returns from musical output even in the face 
of (or precisely due to) widespread piracy. 
At this point, we could take the following view:  as a positive mat-
ter, intellectual property can and often does make a difference by allo-
cating innovation rents among market participants; however, as a 
normative matter, these selection effects are immaterial and therefore 
whether there is more or less intellectual property is a matter of indif-
66 See CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENG-
LISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 188 (1988) (noting that medieval guildsmen 
viewed patents as “an unfair obstruction to the course of their business”); Dominique 
Foray & Liliane Hilaire Perez, The Economics of Open Technology:  Collective Organisation and 
Individual Claims in the “Fabrique Lyonnaise” During the Old Regime, in NEW FRONTIERS IN 
THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 239, 243-44 (Cristiano Antonelli 
et al. eds., 2006) (discussing the eighteenth-century French silk trade, in which monopo-
lies and secrecy were opposed and openness with technology was encouraged). 
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ference from a social point of view.  But this indifference thesis must 
consider a final possibility that is not socially indifferent:  namely, that 
the distributive outcomes generated by stronger or weaker levels of in-
tellectual property may indirectly exert incentive effects with respect 
to the direction (or quality) of innovation investment, even if they exert 
no incentive effect with respect to the rate (or quantity) of innovation 
investment.67  If that is the case, then changes in intellectual property 
protection cannot be reduced to simple politics and implicate a col-
lective interest in maximizing the social value generated by innovation 
investment.   
If intellectual property is not trivial with respect to incentive ef-
fects on the direction of innovation investment, then there must be 
some correlation between the types of firms—or, more generally, the 
forms of organization and other transactional structures—that are ad-
vantaged by stronger or weaker forms of intellectual property and cer-
tain types of innovation investment.  Stronger levels of intellectual 
property coverage logically tend to favor small, relatively unintegrated 
firms by overcoming the “natural” appropriation-cost advantage en-
joyed by large, relatively integrated firms, which have lower-cost access 
to alternative instruments.  Conversely, weaker levels of intellectual 
property coverage logically tend to favor large firms by exacerbating 
their inherent appropriation-cost advantage over entrants that do not 
have access to the appropriation technologies inherent in an inte-
grated form of firm organization.  If intellectual property is abolished, 
then there are few tools available to an unintegrated firm by which to 
recover returns from innovation investment in the face of competition 
by incumbents that have unique access to alternative instruments, in-
cluding global distribution networks, production efficiencies, and firm 
goodwill.  Hence, even if intellectual property has little effect on the 
innovative output of the market in general (which will tend to recover 
innovation rents through some other mechanism), it may have a great 
effect on the transactional and organizational structures used to gov-
ern the production and distribution of intellectual goods, which in 
turn operates to the advantage of some firms and the disadvantage of 
all others. 
67 For the original source of the distinction between the “rate” and “direction” of 
innovation investments, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Re-
sources for Innovation, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (1962). 
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This proposition can be illustrated briefly by historical changes in 
firm organization in the semiconductor industry, which has experi-
enced substantial changes in the enforcement of patents and other 
intellectual property entitlements.68  During the several decades prior 
to and through the early 1980s, patent rights were generally weak:  us-
ing this paper’s terminology, the state set an exorbitant price to pur-
chase units of coverage against third-party imitation.  During this time, 
firms in the industry tended to operate under vertically integrated 
structures—that is, each firm independently maintained R&D, pro-
duction, and distribution capacities—that constrained involuntary 
spillovers by limiting outside access to private knowledge at various 
points in the product development and supply chain.  The high price 
of patent protection caused firms to exploit lower-cost appropriation 
technologies in order to capture innovation returns and indirectly 
raised entry barriers to any firm that could not access those alternative 
appropriation technologies at the same or comparable cost.   
Starting in the early 1980s, however, patent protection was 
strengthened as a result of strong enforcement of patent rights by the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which in turn supported 
wider adoption and litigation of patent rights in the semiconductor 
industry in particular.69  Using the terminology set forth above, the 
state effectively lowered the price at which firms could purchase units 
of coverage through patent protection, which logically enables the en-
try of firms that cannot access alternative appropriation technologies 
at a feasible cost and therefore rely primarily on intellectual property 
to defend innovation rents.  That is precisely what happened.  
68 This paragraph consolidates the more extended discussion of the semiconduc-
tor industry conducted in Barnett, Property as Process, supra note 60.  See also David J. 
Teece, Peter Grindley & Edward Sherry, Appendix A:  The Semi-Conductor Industry, in
DAVID J. TEECE, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 193 (2000) (investigating licensing 
and cross-licensing procedures in the electronics industries); Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis 
& Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effects of Strengthening Patent Rights on Firms Engaged in Cumula-
tive Innovation:  Insights from the Semiconductor Industry, in ENTREPRENEURIAL INPUTS AND 
OUTCOMES 133 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2001) (examining the effects of the “pro-patent” 
shift of the 1980s on the semiconductor industry). 
69 In 1984, the industry successfully lobbied for the enactment of sui generis “mask 
work” design protections.  See Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 901–914 (2006).  However, the statute has had little effect due to certain techno-
logical advances that frustrate replication based solely on reverse engineering of the 
layout design.  See Leon Radomsky, Sixteen Years After the Passage of the U.S. Semiconductor 
Chip Protection Act:  Is International Protection Working?, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1049, 
1051-52 (2000).  Note that this is an example where private appropriation instruments 
surpass, and render moot, an upward adjustment in intellectual property protection. 
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Roughly as the coverage and strength of available intellectual property 
protections increased, the semiconductor market witnessed the rapid 
growth of “fabless” and other “design-only” firms that operate under 
weakly integrated structures that are largely restricted to developing 
patent-protected “chip designs,” which are marketed as intermediate 
inputs to strongly integrated entities that develop “systems on a chip” 
for incorporation into fully assembled electronic devices.  Supported 
by the background structure of intellectual property rights, these “de-
sign shops” can safely rely on contract to disclose and transfer pat-
ented assets and related know-how to other entities that undertake 
capital-intensive manufacturing and other functions farther down the 
supply chain. 
Even if innovative output is largely invariant to the level of intel-
lectual property protections, both firm organization and industry 
composition will vary considerably as a function of the strength of 
governing intellectual property entitlements:  the state-determined 
price of maintaining coverage through intellectual property favors the 
use of certain transactional and organizational structures used to cap-
ture returns from innovation investments, which in turn rewards firms 
that can access those structures at the lowest cost and punishes all 
others.  If so, then intellectual property is primarily a “second-order” 
regulatory device for influencing the organizational structures under 
which intellectual production takes place rather than a “first-order” 
regulatory device for directly inducing innovative output.  As a posi-
tive proposition, that is a matter of great interest and demands further 
inquiry to understand its scope of application.70  But, even if assumed 
70 Professors Arora and Merges pioneered this line of inquiry.  See Ashish Arora & 
Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS.
& CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004) (showing that intellectual property rights can promote 
efficiency by influencing the location of technological innovation); Robert P. Merges, 
A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005) (describing 
how contract law and property rights are more effective when combined, thereby in-
creasing certainty and flexibility and eliminating some of the limitations of each en-
forcement method); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial 
Exchange:  A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1570 (1995) (book review) (noting that 
strong forms of intellectual property increase the viability of contract-based arrange-
ments for licensing technical know-how).  For additional discussion of this relation-
ship, see the contribution by Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky in this Sympo-
sium, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649 (2009).
For relevant empirical studies, see Ashish Arora & Marco Ceccagnoli, Patent Protection, 
Complementary Assets, and Firms’ Incentives for Technology Licensing, 52 MGMT. SCI. 293 
(2006), Joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances:  A 
Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 387 (1997), Joanne E. Oxley, Institu-
tional Environment and the Mechanisms of Governance:  The Impact of Intellectual Property Pro-
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to be true over some meaningful range of circumstances, does this 
proposition have any relevance as a normative matter? 
The differential survival rates of large and small firms—or, more 
precisely, integrated and nonintegrated organizational forms—under 
different levels of intellectual property protection are simply an indus-
trial phenomenon that implicates no incentive effects, unless there is 
evidence to believe that small firms—or, more precisely and generally, 
weakly integrated entities—have unique innovation capacities at some 
stage of the innovation process in some economically meaningful set-
tings.  There is voluminous research on the topic, which, described 
conservatively, is less than determinative in the aggregate.  A fair 
amount of this research, however, supports the view that small firms 
are most suited to undertake breakthrough research projects and are 
often the catalysts of novel technologies that trigger new innovation 
cycles.71  There is especially compelling support for the innovative 
vigor of small firms in the biotechnology market, which, as noted in 
part earlier, historically has been driven by the research and develop-
ment activities of “upstream” firms, which in turn license patent-
protected innovations to large, vertically integrated “downstream” 
pharmaceutical firms.72  Given the high stakes involved and lucrative 
opportunities for third-party expropriation, it is hard to imagine how 
these contractual arrangements among otherwise unrelated entities 
would be implemented rationally without secure property rights. 
These limited findings (which correspond to widespread beliefs in 
the business world on the entrepreneurial virtues of start-ups and 
spin-offs73) may be a function of certain organizational features or a 
simple reflection of different competitive pressures:  large firms tend 
to undertake low-risk, incremental innovation projects that preserve 
market share while small firms tend to undertake high-risk, radical in-
tection on the Structure of Inter-Firm Alliances, 38 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 283 (1999), and 
Pisano, supra note 57. 
71 For some leading sources and reviews of the literature, see P.A. GEROSKI, MAR-
KET DYNAMICS AND ENTRY (1991), and MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ,
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (1982).  For reviews of the literature for a legal 
audience, see Barnett, Genetic Commons, supra note 27, at 1025 n.106, and Barnett, Pri-
vate Protection, supra note 18, at 1287-89. 
72 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
73 See NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, RISK & INNOVATION: THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF 
SMALL HIGH-TECH COMPANIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 9 (1995) (noting that small or 
rapidly growing high-tech companies receive considerable attention in the media, 
business community, and policy circles). 
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novation projects that seek to capture market share.74  In markets 
where this connection between small firms and radical innovation in-
vestment has some empirical grounding, the distributive effects of 
weaker intellectual property protections—and the collateral effects on 
the economic viability of certain transactional structures—may indi-
rectly have incentive effects on the direction of innovation projects that 
are pursued in the market.  While appropriation capacities in general, 
and therefore innovative output in particular, may be roughly con-
stant under stronger and weaker intellectual property regimes, 
thereby implying a complete indifference result, the distribution of 
innovation projects among incremental and radical projects may be 
substantially different, thereby implying a partial indifference result.  
In that case, IP matters—not only as a distributive instrument for allo-
cating innovation rents, but, indirectly, as an incentive instrument for 
driving innovation investment by entities that are inherently best-
suited to undertake the highest-risk research projects.  Even if there is 
little to no change in output under a weak or strong intellectual prop-
erty regime, the average distance of each “inventive step” (or to use 
some patent-law vocabulary, the average degree of nonobviousness) is 
likely to be smallest under a weak intellectual property regime and 
largest under a strong intellectual property regime.  If that is the case 
(and we do not yet have sufficient information to make a robust de-
termination), then more or less intellectual property certainly does 
matter at least some of the time in some markets, even if (or more 
precisely, only if ) intellectual property is construed primarily in its tra-
ditional function as an incentive instrument. 
CONCLUSION
Is intellectual property trivial?  For participants in the heated de-
bates over the socially desirable scope of intellectual property reform, 
this would appear to be a rhetorical question hardly worthy of consid-
eration.  But it is certainly not a rhetorical question in light of the am-
74 The standard culprits for large-firm underperformance in R&D are informa-
tional asymmetries and agency costs, which lead large-firm managers to favor safe pro-
jects over risky projects even if the latter have a higher discounted present value.  For 
arguments to this effect, see NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, supra note 73, at 37-39, 48-51, and 
Bengt Holmström, Agency Costs and Innovation, in THE MARKETS FOR INNOVATION,
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 131 (Richard H. Day et al. eds., 1993).  Broader arguments 
additionally fault the hierarchical structure of large-firm organizations as stifling radi-
cal innovation.  E.g., David J. Teece, Firm Organization, Industrial Structure, and Techno-
logical Innovation, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 193, 200-01, 212-13 (1996). 
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ple empirical evidence suggesting that, in most markets, greater or 
lesser levels of intellectual property protection may make little differ-
ence in regulating innovative output, coupled with abundant evidence 
documenting the wide panoply of alternative instruments by which to 
shield innovation returns.  Hence, there is a sound basis for the oft-
suggested view that a large swath of technological and cultural mar-
kets are likely to support robust levels of innovation investment with 
or without robust levels of intellectual property protection (provided 
that it is additionally observed that firms use other devices to regulate 
access).75
This positive observation would seem to support the normative 
position that intellectual property protections in most markets can be 
relaxed substantially with little effect on innovative output.  The rea-
soning is simple:  if firms can protect intellectual goods without intel-
lectual property, then there would seem to be little, if any, social cost 
in substantially curtailing or even abolishing intellectual property al-
together.  To the contrary, there would necessarily be a social gain if 
innovative output were unaffected while the social costs of the intel-
lectual property regime were eliminated.  But that reasoning is too 
simple:  it ignores the (nontrivial) possibility that the social costs of al-
ternative cost-equivalent appropriation instruments, to which firms 
will necessarily migrate if intellectual property coverage is reduced, 
may exceed the social costs of any lapsed intellectual property instru-
ments.  That possibility is commonly ignored in the intellectual prop-
erty context, where even economically informed commentators regu-
larly advocate substantially limiting or withdrawing intellectual 
property protections because markets can and do use other instru-
ments in order to extract sufficient innovation returns.76
75 This proviso is often dropped.  For a fuller description of the extensive implica-
tions of this omission and a revised understanding of markets that apparently support 
intellectual production without intellectual property, see Barnett, Sharing, supra note 13. 
76 See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY
(2008), which pursues this argument in detail in a book-length contribution that advo-
cates the complete abolition of intellectual property.  For other indicative examples, 
see LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 10, at 12-14, which provides 
examples of musical creation, scientific research, and software development where in-
novators build freely on previous contributions and then argues that free access, rather 
than a market-based ownership system, is the presumptive regime that should govern 
informational goods, and Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a 
Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 36-37 (2004), which questions the need for copyright 
given that “many forms of creative expression—such as fashions, new words and slo-
gans, jokes and magic tricks, and the food industry—have flourished in the absence of 
protection.” 
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This typical argument suffers from the blindness of a static analy-
sis.  It assumes that reductions in intellectual property coverage will 
inherently expand the public domain of freely accessible knowledge 
and thereby lower entry costs into the relevant market, albeit at the 
expense of reduced innovation gains.  But normative analysis of intel-
lectual property coverage must be dynamic (and complex) if it is to be 
realistic:  that is, it must anticipate that any downward adjustment in 
intellectual property coverage will trigger a variety of possible market 
responses that may neutralize or even reverse the adjustment, result-
ing in (i) no net change in access costs, (ii) a net reduction in access 
costs, or (iii) in the most perverse case, even a net increase in access 
costs coupled with a reduction in innovation gains.  Certainly, further 
theoretical work is required to identify more precisely the parameters 
under which changes in intellectual property protection are likely to 
yield net positive, negative, or neutral incentive/access effects.  But 
even in the simplest and most benevolent scenario, where the market 
simply substitutes substantially cost-equivalent appropriation instru-
ments for state-provided legal entitlements such that innovation in-
centives and access costs are held constant, there is a plausible case for 
a net social loss.  This is because the private appropriation technolo-
gies that support this invariance result may be available at relatively 
lower cost to strongly integrated, large-firm organizations and rela-
tively higher cost to weakly integrated, small-firm organizations.  
Hence, even if weaker or stronger levels of intellectual property pro-
tection have little effect on access costs and innovation gains, thereby 
resulting in substantially equivalent levels of innovative output, any re-
laxation of intellectual property rights may still result in a distributive 
loss insofar as the costs of making recourse to alternative instruments 
vary across firm types. 
This discussion identifies one of the most salient questions for fu-
ture policy analysis:  do we care about distributive losses that transfer 
rents from some firms (usually smaller, weakly integrated entities) to 
other firms (usually larger, strongly integrated entities) as a function 
of different levels of intellectual property protection?  This question 
might be rephrased even more simply as follows:  do the distributive 
effects generated by adjustments in intellectual property coverage 
raise any efficiency implications?77  Certainly some rent transfers are 
77 I leave open the precise definition of efficiency—whether it be the narrow defi-
nition of allocative efficiency, the broader definition of productive efficiency, or the 
even broader definition of innovative efficiency—for purposes of assessing the social 
costs of distributive losses attendant to rent transfers induced by adjustments in intel-
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socially indifferent.  For example, there is no obvious distributive 
ground for favoring record labels over hardware manufacturers or 
concert promoters in the music business, or vice versa.  So the transfer 
of rents within the music business as a result of the erosion of copy-
right is a descriptive observation with no normative implications.  But 
some rent transfers may raise the prospect of considerable social 
losses from an efficiency point of view, which may in turn identify a 
determinant policy response.  In particular, if weak levels of intellec-
tual property protection drive firms to shield legally unprotected 
spillovers by accumulating a broad set of complementary assets and 
competencies so as to achieve high levels of vertical and horizontal in-
tegration, then it will inherently escalate the minimum cost of enter-
ing the market, thereby limiting entry threats, enhancing incumbents’ 
pricing power, and distorting incumbents’ choices of organizational 
forms and transactional designs.  And if there is ground to tie inte-
grated forms of business organization and high levels of market con-
centration with depressed incentives to make certain types of innova-
tion investments, then the distributive losses from weak intellectual 
property protection plausibly would yield substantial efficiency losses 
even if innovative output in general is largely unaffected. 
The ultimate lesson for intellectual property policy can be stated 
most precisely as follows:  It is difficult to anticipate the effects of ad-
justments in intellectual property coverage without undertaking a dy-
namic analysis that anticipates firms’ different capacities to exploit al-
ternative instruments, which may allow some firms to replicate or even 
exceed appropriation capacities provided by intellectual property en-
titlements.  This analysis requires information as to three crucial fac-
tors:  (i) the distribution of costs of coverage across intellectual prop-
erty and alternative appropriation technologies; (ii) the distribution 
of the costs of alternative appropriation technologies across firm 
types; and, in some cases, (iii) the distribution of the units of coverage 
across alternative appropriation technologies.  Simple correlations be-
tween more IP and more output and less access, or less IP and less 
output and more access, are useful for some analytical purposes in 
scholarly discussion and strategic purposes in political rhetoric.  But, 
for purposes of practically oriented policy analysis, these correlations 
are often unsupported by empirical conditions on the ground and are 
lectual property coverage.  For discussions of these various distinctions, see Joseph F. 
Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust:  Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological 
Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1032-33 (1987), and F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency, 
and Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 998, 998-1002 (1987). 
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therefore unlikely to provide a reliable framework by which to antici-
pate the complex and sometimes perverse effects of proposed changes 
in intellectual property coverage.  Hence, the familiar “antimonopoly” 
tendency to favor relaxed intellectual property protections in order to 
free the commons can inadvertently advance concentrated market 
conditions where entrenched incumbents are protected by natural 
barriers to entry by “disruptive” small-firm competitors.   
Serious thought should be given to whether the weak patent re-
gime that prevailed in the United States from roughly the 1930s 
through the early 1980s supported conglomerate forms of industrial 
organization in industries that are often viewed as having suffered 
from low entry rates, limited price competition, and conservative ten-
dencies of technological innovation.  And serious thought should be 
given to whether the relatively strong patent regime that has prevailed 
since the early 1980s has supported the development in some of the 
most innovative technology sectors (most notably, biotechnology and 
semiconductors) of a variety of cooperative structures that exploit the 
differential competencies of largely unintegrated firms, including, in 
particular, smaller firms that have strong design competencies but 
lack manufacturing or distribution capacities.  If there is a strong rela-
tionship between intellectual property protection and firms’ choices 
of organizational forms and transactional structures, and if firms’ 
choices of industrial organization or transactional structures in turn 
govern the direction of firms’ innovation investments in a manner 
that is socially relevant, then the social costs of weak intellectual prop-
erty protection would be great even in the otherwise neutral case 
where innovative output is largely insensitive to stronger or weaker 
levels of intellectual property protection.  So intellectual property 
might very well matter, but by a circuitous route that cannot be antici-
pated by straightforward application of the standard incentives/access 
tradeoff. 
Inquiry into these tantalizing questions holds the promise of a 
powerful intellectual marriage between the incentive framework that 
characterizes the intellectual property literature and the economizing 
framework that characterizes the transaction-cost-economics litera-
ture.  If intellectual property plays a meaningful role as an incentive 
instrument, our best current understanding suggests that it can only 
do so if there is ground to believe that supporting innovation invest-
ment within weakly integrated forms of organization yields efficiency 
gains by bolstering those entities’ unique competencies at certain 
stages in the innovation process.  If there is evidence to support this 
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view (and, preliminarily, there is support in a number of important 
industries), then intellectual property does matter—as an incentive in-
strument that regulates firms’ innovation behavior indirectly at the 
level of organizational and transactional design.  If not, then it really is
largely trivial, in which case it reduces to a socially indifferent distribu-
tive instrument for slicing up the economic pie created by innovation 
investments—a “merely” political question as to which any socially in-
terested normative analysis may have little to add.
